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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,1 the
Supreme Court ruled that States have sovereign immunity from suit in the
courts of another State. Attention has focused both on the merits of such
immunity and on the fact that Hyatt overruled a prior precedent.2 Although
these issues are significant, the nature of the analysis the Court used to
reach its decision has broader implications for our understanding of
constitutional federalism. The Court explicitly invoked principles drawn
from the law of nations—today known as public international law—to
determine the sovereign rights of the States under the Constitution. Justice
Thomas began his opinion for the Court by observing that “[a]fter
independence, the States considered themselves fully sovereign nations,”3
and as such were “‘exemp[t] . . . from all [foreign] jurisdiction.’”4 The
Court relied on “[t]he Constitution’s use of the term, ‘States’” to support the
States’ retention of this traditional aspect of sovereignty.5 The Court
reasoned that the States continued to possess this immunity unless they
affirmatively surrendered it in the Constitution. Although the Court
acknowledged that the States surrendered some of their sovereign immunity
(by authorizing certain suits against them in federal court), it concluded that
nothing in the Constitution sufficed to surrender their immunity from suits
in state court.
The Hyatt Court’s analysis has significance far beyond the immunity
of one State in the courts of another.6 The original public meaning of the
term “States” has important implications for several of the Court’s most
prominent federalism doctrines. These doctrines have been controversial
both on and off the Court because critics charge that they lack an adequate
basis in the constitutional text. The framework employed by the Court in
Hyatt answers these criticisms by grounding the doctrines in the meaning of
the term “States” as used in the Constitution. The term “States” was a term
of art drawn from the law of nations and signified a sovereign nation with a
set of widely recognized sovereign rights. Under the law of nations, a
“State” could only relinquish its sovereign rights by a clear and express
1

139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
3
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493.
4
Id. at 1494 (quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 108, at 486).
5
Id.
6
For example, the Hyatt Court’s approach is directly relevant to understanding the proper scope of state
sovereign immunity and Congress’s power to abrogate such immunity under its enumerated powers—questions
that will come before the Court this Term. See Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139
S. Ct. 2664 (2019).
2
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surrender in a binding legal instrument (such as the Constitution). If, as
Hyatt stated, the American States possessed full sovereignty at the
founding, then many of the Court’s most controversial federalism decisions
have a forgotten basis in the original public meaning of the term “State” as
understood against background principles of the law of nations.
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a
renewed commitment to constitutional federalism. In addition to enforcing
the limits of Congress’s commerce power,7 the Court has upheld three
important constitutional immunities possessed by the States. First, the
Court has reaffirmed that States have sovereign immunity from suits
brought by individuals, and that Congress generally lacks authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I, Section 8
powers.8 Second, the Court has recognized that Congress has no
constitutional power to commandeer the legislative and executive
departments of the States.9 Third, the Court has reiterated that the States
possess equal sovereignty under the Constitution, and that Congress has
limited power to override such sovereignty.10 The Court’s recognition of
these three immunities has allowed the States greater freedom to operate as
distinct sovereigns within a federal system. At the same time, these
developments have sparked controversy both on and off the Court. Critics
contend that these immunities lack adequate support in the Constitution and
that the Court has therefore overreached in recognizing and enforcing them.
Some of this criticism has come from an unexpected quarter—proponents
of textualism in constitutional interpretation. Because the text of the
Constitution does not affirmatively confer these state immunities, textualists
claim that these judicial doctrines are inconsistent with fidelity to the
constitutional text and the compromises that it embodies.11
As Hyatt suggests, this apparent tension between textualism and
federalism can be resolved by resort to a surprising source—international
law. Most observers regard the proper understanding of federalism under
the U.S. Constitution as a pure question of domestic law. It is impossible,
however, to understand American federalism without consulting
background principles of the law of nations invoked by the Declaration of
7
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); cf. Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 519 (2012) (upholding the individual mandate under the Affordable Care
Act as a tax even though it exceeded the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce).
8
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The
Court has recognized a narrow exception when Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity pursuant to its
bankruptcy power. See Central Va. Comm. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
9
See Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); Printz v. United States,
532 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10
See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
11
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009).
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Independence and reflected in both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution. These principles help to resolve the apparent tension between
textualism and several important federalism doctrines by clarifying the
Constitution’s delegation of powers to the federal government, its
reservation of powers to the States, and the proper approach to interpreting
the provisions allocating these respective powers. The term “States” was a
term of art drawn directly from the law of nations, and the founders
presumably understood the term by reference to such law. Accordingly, the
law of nations provides crucial background context for understanding both
the original sovereign rights enjoyed by States and the extent to which they
relinquished such rights by adopting the Constitution. Read in light of the
law of nations, the Constitution provides a firm textual basis for many of
the Court’s most prominent—and controversial—federalism doctrines.
Several commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s
renewed commitment to federalism is incompatible with its embrace of
textualism. Textualism seeks to ascertain the meaning of a legal provision
by asking how a reasonably skilled user of language would have understood
the text in its original context.12 The Court has used textualism to interpret
both statutes and, to a lesser extent, the Constitution. Federalism refers to
the Constitution’s division of governmental authority between the federal
government and the States. In the decades following the New Deal, the
Court interpreted the Constitution to impose few, if any, constraints on
federal power vis-à-vis the States. In a series of decisions over the past
three decades, however, the Court has renewed its commitment to
federalism by upholding the governance prerogatives of the States against
various forms of unwarranted federal regulation. The Court’s simultaneous
embrace of federalism and textualism is among the most striking features of
the Court’s jurisprudence in recent decades.
Critics charge that the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines are
incompatible with textualism. For example, John Manning has argued that
the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity
doctrines “lack any discernable textual source” in the Constitution.13 In his
view, these “new federalism” decisions are problematic because they rest on
nothing more than “freestanding federalism.”14 Freestanding federalism, as
he uses the phrase, “seeks the founders’ decisions not in the meaning of any
discrete clause, but in the overall system of government they adopted in the

12

See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (stating that “in
practice [textualism] is associated with the basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public
meaning of the enacted text, understood in context”).
13
Id. at 2009.
14
Id. at 2005, 2040.
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document.”15 The problem he sees with this approach is that it focuses not
on the specific meaning of the constitutional text but instead on the broad
general purpose—federalism—underlying the text.16
Dean Manning
regards the Court’s reliance on freestanding federalism as incompatible with
textualism because such reliance disregards hard-fought compromises built
into the constitutional text.17
In an important early article on this topic, Mike Rappaport sought to
reconcile textualism and federalism by arguing that “the textual basis for the
immunities against being commandeered, taxed, and regulated is not the
Tenth Amendment or the structure of the Constitution, but instead is the
term ‘State.’”18 In his view, “[b]y calling the local governments ‘States,’
the Framers intended that these governments possess some of the traditional
immunities that states enjoyed.”19 He reasoned as follows. “In 1789, the
principal meaning of the term [‘State’] in this context was an independent
nation or country that had complete sovereignty.”20 He did not contend,
however, that the Constitution used the term “State” in this pure sense
because “the states did not retain all the powers of independent countries.”21
Rather, he argued that the term “should be interpreted as an entity that has
some, but not all, of the sovereign powers of an independent country.”22 In
reaching this conclusion, Professor Rappaport relied on the Constitution’s
“structure, purpose, and history.”23 Although he acknowledged that “this
interpretation does depart from the ordinary meaning” of the term “State,”
he argued that such departures are “common and entirely appropriate.”24 In
the end, he concluded that the term “State” should be read to confer at least
three state immunities against the federal government—immunities against
being “commandeered, taxed, and regulated.”25 In his view, these

15

Id. at 2006.
Id. at 2047.
17
Id. at 2040. See also Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 N.W.U. L. REV. 1297,
1299 (2019) (observing that the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity decisions
“are grounded in abstract notions of constitutional structure, rather than the original meaning of the constitutional
text”). For a defense of freestanding federalism, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of
Freestanding Federalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 99 (2009) (maintaining that “Manning's argument is far more
destabilizing to existing doctrines and long-established practices of constitutional interpretation than he
acknowledges”).
18
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme
Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 821 (1999).
19
Id. at 821.
20
Id. at 830.
21
Id. at 831.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 837.
24
Id. at 836.
25
Id. at 821. Professor Rappaport also argues that state sovereign immunity in both federal and state court
can be traced to the Article III judicial power and the Constitution’s use of the term “States.” See id. at 869-74.
16
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immunities “are necessary to ensure that the states retain at least some
sovereignty and that they can perform their constitutional functions.”26
Although Professor Rappaport’s approach starts with the
constitutional text, his conclusion that the term “States” had a narrower—
yet unspecified—meaning has led prominent scholars to doubt that his
approach is capable of reconciling textualism with the Court’s federalism
decisions. For example, Dean Manning observes that “[i]f the Constitution
mixed and matched powers that had traditionally belonged indivisibly to
sovereign ‘states,’ then the traditional meaning of sovereignty cannot
meaningfully inform the question of what residual powers remained in
distinctly American ‘states’ after the ratification of the Constitution.”27
Similarly, Ernie Young questions “whether the term ‘state’ itself is really
doing any of the interpretive work in his analysis.”28 Professor Young
argues that because Rappaport “concedes that we cannot simply adopt the
eighteenth-century definition of ‘state’ as a fully sovereign power,” his
approach ultimately turns on “structural questions, not textual ones.”29
Finally, Will Baude notes that Rappaport’s “theory has the virtue of
pointing to an actual textual provision, but it still requires packing a single
word with an awful lot of freight.”30
In our view, it is possible to resolve the apparent conflict between
federalism and textualism by looking to crucial background context
provided by international law. Professor Rappaport properly emphasized
the use of the word “State” in the Constitution, but he was too quick to
dismiss the original public meaning of the term—drawn from the law of
nations—in favor of a novel meaning informed by his understanding of the
Constitution’s “structure, purpose, and history.” In drafting and ratifying
the Constitution, the founders would have understood the term “State” to
refer to a separate sovereign possessing all of the rights traditionally
recognized by the law of nations. The term “State” was a term of art drawn
straight from the law of nations and is still used today to refer to
independent nation-states with full sovereignty. Accordingly, the crucial
inquiry is not whether “State” meant “State” in the Constitution (it did), but
the extent to which the American States affirmatively relinquished portions
of their sovereignty in the Constitution. This latter inquiry can be answered
only by consulting additional principles supplied by the law of nations to
govern the surrender of sovereign rights.
26

Id. at 838.
Manning, supra note 11, at 2061 n.255.
28
Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601,
1625 (2000).
29
Id. at 1626.
30
William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017).
27
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Using international law both to define the meaning of the term
“State” and to identify the extent to which the American States surrendered
key aspects of their sovereignty in the Constitution reconciles many of the
Supreme Court’s most significant federalism doctrines with textualism.
Under this textual and historical approach to federalism, courts should
determine the scope of state sovereignty under the Constitution by starting
with the baseline assumption that “States” possessed full sovereignty at the
founding, and then ascertaining the extent to which they surrendered aspects
of their sovereignty in the constitutional text. To be sure, in adopting the
Constitution, the States surrendered many important aspects of traditional
sovereignty, such as their rights to make treaties, engage in war, and govern
exclusively within their own territories. But they also did not surrender—
and thus retained—many of the sovereign rights traditionally recognized by
the law of nations. One need not rely on general concepts of “freestanding
federalism,” “structure,” or “purpose” to identify these areas of residual
state sovereignty under the Constitution. Rather, one can ascertain such
sovereignty with precision by examining the constitutional text in light of
background principles of the law of nations. Such examination reveals with
surprising precision which aspects of sovereignty the States partially or
fully surrendered to the federal government in the Constitution.
This approach to federalism suggests that courts and commentators
frequently ask the wrong question regarding the scope of the States’
residual sovereignty under the Constitution. Instead of inquiring whether
the Constitution contains an express provision affirmatively conferring or
preserving a particular aspect of state sovereignty, they should be asking
whether the Constitution contains a provision affirmatively withdrawing or
restricting a particular aspect of state sovereignty. Under principles of the
law of nations well known to the founders, the States necessarily retained
their preexisting sovereign rights unless they clearly and expressly
surrendered them. For this reason, constitutional silence on a question of
federalism signifies retention—rather than surrender—of the States’ preexisting sovereignty.31
This background context provided by the law of nations reveals a
forgotten constitutional basis for many of the Supreme Court’s most
significant federalism doctrines, including state sovereign immunity, the
rule against federal commandeering of state legislative and executive
departments, and the sovereign equality of the States. Critics insist that
these immunities lack a firm basis in the constitutional text and are
necessarily the result of improper judicial activism. But this criticism has
31
This approach to constitutional interpretation is different than a “strict construction” approach, as that
approach is typically understood. See infra note 176, and accompanying text.
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things backwards. There was no need for the Constitution to spell out the
rights of sovereign States in the text because—under the law of nations—
States retained all rights that they did not affirmatively surrender. The
American States could have compromised their sovereign rights—including
sovereign immunity, immunity from commandeering, and equal
sovereignty—only by adopting constitutional provisions that expressly
altered or surrendered them. Thus, unless the Constitution expressly
overrides the States’ pre-existing sovereign rights, the “States” necessarily
retained them. This understanding of state sovereignty is based on the
original public meaning of the constitutional text taken in historical context
rather than on freestanding federalism or judicial activism.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the sovereign
rights of the American “States” under the law of nations following the
Declaration of Independence. The law of nations not only defined the rights
and immunities of “free and independent States,” but also provided rules
governing their surrender. Part II discusses the sovereignty of the States
under the Articles of Confederation, and explains why this short-lived
arrangement failed. Part III reviews the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution and the precise ways in which the States did—and did not—
surrender portions of their sovereignty by adopting the Constitution.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of our understanding of the term
“States” for three of the Supreme Court’s most prominent federalism
doctrines—state sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and
the equal sovereignty of the States. The Article concludes that reading the
term “States” against background principles of the law of nations provides
substantial textual and historical support for each of these doctrines.
I. STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE LAW OF NATIONS
It is common ground that the Constitution established a federal
system of government by dividing power between the individual States and
an overarching federal government. Perhaps surprisingly, significant
features of this system remain contested more than two centuries after its
adoption. Disagreements about the system stem in part from differences
over the proper method of constitutional interpretation. Some observers
believe that courts should sometimes downplay or ignore the text and
understand federalism by reference to general conceptions of the federalstate balance reflected in the history, structure, and purpose of the
Constitution.32
This camp tends to favor more robust federalism
32
In several important cases, the Supreme Court has relied on history and structure to resolve federalism
issues, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must be sought in historical understanding

8
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doctrines.33 Other observers insist that federalism—like separation of
powers—does not exist in the abstract but must be defined by precise
provisions of the constitutional text.34 This camp tends to favor less robust
federalism doctrines. Beyond this divide, there are many other contested
approaches to constitutional federalism.35
One need not endorse one particular approach over the others,
however, in order to conclude that the constitutional text—properly
understood in historical context—supports several of the Supreme Court’s
most significant federalism doctrines. The original public meaning of the
term “States” in the Constitution supports the Court’s adherence to these
doctrines. “States” was a term of art drawn from the law of nations, and its
meaning was well known to the founders. The law of nations not only
defined the rights of States, but also provided rules governing how States
surrendered their rights. As discussed in Part III, both aspects of the law of

and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (“Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the commonlaw tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by
constitutional design.”); as well as recited purposes of the federal structure established by the Constitution, see,
e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“The
Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom,
first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom
all governmental powers are derived.”).
33
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 75-94 (2019); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 125; Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987).
34
See Manning, supra note 11.
35
In resolving constitutional federalism questions, the Supreme Court has largely embraced a theory of dual
sovereignty federalism. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also has
recognized this fundamental principle.”). Other scholars have debated the merits of cooperative federalism, “a
vision of independent governments working together to implement federal policy.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998). See, e.g., Philip Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001); Joshua Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of
Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1997). Still other scholars have described the U.S.
federal system as one of “dynamic federalism,” a system in which “federal and state governments function as
alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the authority of both the federal and state
governments.” J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 103 (2010). For discussions of dynamic
federalism, see Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY
L.J. 159 (2006); Robert Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). For
arguments that federalism debates should not be framed in terms of dual sovereignty but that there are nonetheless
benefits to decentralization, see Heather Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695 (2017); Abbe Gluck,
Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1077, 1119 (2014); ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011). Some scholars even
contend that federalism is an outdated artifact and should be generally disregarded. See Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

nations are relevant to a proper understanding of state sovereignty under the
Constitution.
The founding generation initially employed the term “States” in the
Declaration of Independence more than a decade before they used it in the
Constitution. The original Thirteen Colonies in North America were
established as part of the British Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Dissatisfied with British rule, the Colonies declared their
independence from Great Britain and proceeded to win their independence
on the battlefield. In declaring their independence, the United Colonies
declared themselves to be “free and independent States” with “full power to
levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to all
other acts and things which independent states may of right do.”36 The law
of nations defined the rights and obligations of independent states vis-à-vis
one another, and the Declaration of Independence clearly claimed these
rights for the American States.
Because the sovereign rights of independent states would have been
well known to members of the Continental Congress (who were waging a
war to secure them), they had no need to spell out all such rights in the
Declaration. It was sufficient to refer to several prominent rights along with
“all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.” All
who read the Declaration—including Great Britain—understood that the
Colonies were claiming for themselves all of the rights of free and
independent states under the law of nations.
After the War of
Independence, Great Britain formally recognized the independence of the
Colonies in terms that echoed the Declaration of Independence. Article I of
the provisional peace treaty provided that “His Britannic Majesty
acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free, sovereign and
independent States.”37 By recognizing the United States as “free, sovereign
and independent States,” Great Britain was acknowledging both the
independence of the States from Great Britain and their possession of
sovereign rights under the law of nations.
After achieving their independence, the American States voluntarily
surrendered some of their sovereign rights first in the Articles of
Confederation and then in the Constitution. Before considering the precise
effect of these instruments on state sovereignty, it is useful to identify the
rights that the States secured for themselves through the Declaration of
Independence and the War of Independence. These rights were not mere
platitudes but defined what it meant to be a “State.” This Part provides an
overview of the rights of free and independent states under the law of
36
37

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
Provisional Articles, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, Nov. 30, 1782, 8 Stat. 54.
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nations, and then discusses several specific rights of sovereign states that
have particular relevance to the Constitution’s allocation of sovereignty
between the federal government and the States. This Part also describes the
rules that governed how sovereign states could surrender portions of their
sovereignty under the law of nations. After identifying the baseline of
sovereignty that “free and independent States” enjoyed under the law of
nations, we turn in Parts II and III to identify the rights that the States
surrendered—and retained—by adopting first the Articles of Confederation,
and later the Constitution.
A.

Overview of Sovereign Rights under the Law of Nations

The American States secured a broad array of important sovereign
rights recognized by the law of nations when they achieved the status of
“free and independent States.”
As stated in the Declaration of
Independence, these rights included “full power to levy war, conclude
peace, contract alliances, [and] establish commerce.” The Declaration also
referred to “all other acts and things which independent states may of right
do.” This reference was to the full body of rights enjoyed by sovereign
states under the law of nations.
Sovereign “states”—also known as “nations”—possessed numerous
important rights under the law of nations, including rights of selfgovernance, territorial sovereignty, and equal sovereignty. The Law of
Nations by Emmerich de Vattel38 was the most influential treatise on the
law of nations in England and America during the founding period.39 In
this work, Vattel described the established rights of sovereign states under
the law of nations. A “sovereign state,” Vattel explained, is any “nation
that governs itself . . . without any dependence on a foreign power.”40 The
rights that sovereign states enjoyed under the law of nations provide a
crucial backdrop for understanding which rights the States surrendered and
which rights they retained by adopting the Constitution.41

38
1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Newberry et al. eds., 1760) [hereinafter 1
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS]; 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Coote ed., 1759)
[hereinafter 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS].
39
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 15-16 (2009); Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign
Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 67 (1999) (explaining that in decisions of
American courts, “in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius,
twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and staggering ninety-two to Vattel”); David Gray Adler, The President’s
Recognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 137 (David
Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“During the Founding period and well beyond, Vattel was, in the
United States, the unsurpassed publicist on international law.”).
40
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. I, § 4, at 10.
41
See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012).
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Nations had numerous specific and well-recognized rights under the
law of nations. First and foremost, states enjoyed rights to self-government
and territorial sovereignty.42 In addition, nations enjoyed the right to selfprotection and preservation,43 including the right to be free from harm to
one’s citizens or subjects by another nation.44 Nations had the right to
pursue, and establish the terms of, commerce with other nations,45 including
the right to free and equal use of the high seas. Inherent in all of these
rights was the right to maintain sovereign dignity and equality with and
among other nations,46 such as the right to have one’s judgments respected
by other nations.47 To uphold these rights, each nation enjoyed a “right to
security”—“a right not to suffer any other to obstruct its preservation, its
perfection, and happiness, that is, to preserve itself from all injuries.”48
The law of nations also recognized the means by which nations
could enforce and adjust their rights vis-à-vis other nations. Nations had the
right to conduct diplomatic relations with each other. “It is necessary that
nations should treat with each other for the good of their affairs, for
avoiding reciprocal damages, and for adjusting and terminating their
differences.”49 Accordingly, each nation enjoyed the right of embassy—to
send and receive ambassadors and other public ministers.50 Ambassadors
and other public ministers enjoyed important rights to security, “for if their
person be not defended from violence of every kind, the right of embassies
becomes precarious, and the success very uncertain.”51 Thus, “[w]ho ever
offers any violence to an ambassador, or any other public minister, not only
injures the sovereign whom this minister represents, but he also hurts the
common safety and well-being of nations.”52
In conducting diplomacy, nations enjoyed the right to make treaties
and enter into other public conventions with each other53 in accordance with
the procedural requirements of domestic law.54 Nations used treaties both
to adjust and to enforce their rights under the law of nations. When
diplomacy failed to redress one nation’s violation of another’s rights under
the law of nations, the offended nation enjoyed the right to pursue various
42

1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, §§ 79-98, at 146-52.
Id., bk. II, § 1-20, at 120-27.
Id., bk. II, §§ 71-78, at 144-46.
45
Id., bk. II, §§ 21-34, at 128-32.
46
Id., bk. II, §§ 35-48, at 133-37.
47
Id., bk. II, § 84, at 147-48.
48
Id., bk. II, §§ 49, at 137.
49
2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. IV, § 55, at 132.
50
Id., bk. IV, § 55-79, at 132-41.
51
Id., bk. IV, § 81, at 142.
52
Id.
53
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, §§152-217, at 171-202.
54
Id., bk. II, § 154, at 171 (“In the fundamental laws of each state, we must see what is the power capable of
contracting with validity in the name of the state.”).
43
44

12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

means of redress, including retortion and reprisals.55 Ultimately, if a
sovereign was unable to obtain satisfaction for a violation of its rights
through diplomacy or retaliatory measures, the state had the right to wage
war against the offender. Vattel extensively addressed the rights of nations
to declare war, conduct war, and maintain neutrality in the wars of others.56
As discussed in Part III, the American States gave up some, but not all, of
their sovereign rights in the Constitution.
B.

The Right to Self-Government and Independence

Two rights of states under the law of nations have particular
relevance to contested federalism doctrines under the Constitution. As
Vattel explained, free and independent states enjoyed the right to selfgovernment and independence, and the right to equality with other nations.
These rights are crucial to evaluating several of the Supreme Court’s most
prominent federalism doctrines, including state sovereign immunity, the
anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal sovereignty of the States—as
Part IV discusses.
A basic right of sovereign states under the law of nations was the
right of self-governance. This right prohibited any state from controlling
how another state governed itself. For Vattel, the right to self-government
was essential to the very meaning of a sovereign state. “Every nation that
governs itself,” Vattel wrote, “under what form soever, without any
dependence on a foreign power, is a sovereign state. Its rights are naturally
the same as those of any other state.”57 Because each sovereign state
enjoyed the right to self-government, no state could interfere in the
government of another. “It is a manifest consequence of the liberty and
independence of nations,” Vattel explained, “that all have a right to be
governed as they think proper, and that none have the least authority to
interfere in the government of another state.”58 Given this right, “[i]t does
not . . . belong to any foreign power to take cognizance of the
administration of this sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct,
and to oblige him to alter it.”59 Vattel characterized a state’s right to noninterference in its governance as its “most precious” right. “Of all the rights
that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and
that which others ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not
do it an injury.”60
55

Id., bk. II, §§ 341-42, at 249.
2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. III.
57
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. I, § 4, at 10.
58
2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 54, at 138.
59
Id., bk. II, § 55, at 138.
60
Id.
56
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For Vattel, the purpose of a state’s right to govern itself was to
enable its citizens or subjects to “procure their mutual safety and advantage
by means of their union.”61 Accordingly, he described various objects
subject to regulation by a sovereign’s governing authority, free from
interference by other nations. Overall, “[t]he society is established with the
view of procuring to those who are its members, the necessities,
conveniences, and even accommodations of life; and in general, every thing
necessary to their felicity; to take such measures that each may peacefully
enjoy his own property, and obtain justice with safety; and, in short, to
defend the whole from all violence from without.”62 In sum, a state had
authority, free from interference by other nations, (1) to provide for the
necessities of the nation,63 (2) to ensure its happiness,64 and (3) to fortify
itself against external attacks.65
Because the right of self-governance was foundational, a sovereign
state had the right to oppose any interference with this right through
whatever means necessary. For this reason, Vattel characterized the right to
self-government as a “perfect right,” the violation of which gave the
offended nation just cause to protect the right through the use of force.
Because “foreign nations have no right to intrude themselves into the
government of an independent state,” an offended state “has a right of
refusing to suffer it. To govern itself according to its pleasure, is a
necessary part of its independence.”66
As discussed in Part IV, the right of sovereign states to govern
themselves provides crucial background for understanding the constitutional
61

1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., § 1, at 1.
Id., bk. I, § 72, at 35.
First, “[t]he nation, or its conductor, should . . . apply to the business of providing for all the wants of the
people, and producing a happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences and innocent and
laudable enjoyments.” Id. Vattel described many ways in which a nation should secure “the necessaries of life”
for the people. These ways included ensuring that land was used productively for agriculture, id., bk. I, §§ 77-82,
at 36-38; regulating domestic commerce and deciding how to engage in foreign commerce, id. bk. I, §§ 83-99, at
38-44; providing a proper infrastructure, id. bk. I, §§ 100-104, at 44-45; and coining money, id. bk. I, §§ 105-109,
at 45-47.
64
The second object of government, as described by Vattel, is to ensure the happiness of the people. “[T]he
conductors of the nation . . . are to labour after its felicity, to watch continually over it, and to advance it to the
utmost of their power.” Id., bk. I, § 110, at 47. Toward this end, Vattel explained, the government should provide
for the education of youth, id., bk. I, § 112, at 48; promote the arts and sciences, id., bk. I, § 113, at 48-49; ensure
the freedom of philosophical discussion, id., bk. I, § 114, at 49-50; promote virtue and deter vice, id., bk. I, § 115,
at 50; inspire love of country, id., bk I, § 119, at 52; resolve matters of religion; id., bk. I, § 125-57, at 54-71; and
establish and enforce good laws in service of justice, id., bk. I, § 158-76, 71-79—among other objects.
65
The third object of government described by Vattel was fortify itself from external attacks. “One of the
ends of political society is to defend itself, by means of its union from all insults or violence from without.” Id.,
bk. I, § 177, at 79. To serve this object, Vattel explained, a sovereign state may take measures to increase its
population, assemble and train armed forces, and develop public and private wealth. Id., bk. I, §§ 177-82, at 7982. “The nation ought to put itself in such a state as to be able to repel and humble an unjust enemy; this is an
important duty, which the care of its perfection, and even preservation itself, imposes both on the state and its
conductor.” Id., bk. I, § 177, at 79.
66
Id. bk. II, § 57, at 140.
62
63
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basis for the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing the States’ sovereign
immunity and their right not to be commandeered by the federal
government. When the American States became “free and independent
States,” they secured the right to govern themselves free of these kinds of
outside interference. Unless they clearly and expressly surrendered this
right in the Constitution, the “States” referred to in the Constitution
necessarily retained it. Judicial doctrines recognizing state sovereign
immunity and prohibiting federal commandeering of the States uphold this
basic aspect of state sovereignty.
C.

The Right to Equal Sovereignty

Another important right of free and independent states was the right
to equal sovereignty with other states. Although there is some dispute as to
when this principle first emerged,67 there is no doubt that it was well
established prior to the founding. Vattel described the equality of nations as
a fundamental principle of the law of nations. The rationale for the equality
of nations, Vattel explained, was the equality of the persons who comprise
them:
Since men are naturally equal, and their rights and
obligations are the same, as equally proceeding from nature,
nations composed of men considered as so many free
persons, living together in a state of nature, are naturally
equal, and receive from nature the same obligations and
rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce
any difference. . . . [A] small republic is as much a sovereign
state as the most powerful kingdom.68
As a result of their natural equality, nations enjoyed the same rights under
the law of nations:

67
Compare Hidemi Suganami, Grotius and International Equality, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Bull et al., eds 1992) (arguing that Grotius’ work is consistent with the equality of states); with
Benedict Kingsbury, A Groatian Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the
Thought of Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 3, 15 (1997) (observing that “Grotius had no general doctrine of
the equality of sovereign entities”).
68
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., § 18, at 6. Burlamaqui provided the same
rationale for the equal rights of sovereigns under the law of nations. The society of nations, he wrote, is
a state of equality and independence, which establishes a parity of right between them; and
engages them to have the same regard and respect for one another. Hence the general
principle of the law of nations is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which
obliges all nations that have any intercourse with one another, to practise those duties to
which individuals are naturally subject.
1 J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 175 (Nugent trans., Boston, Joseph
Bumstead, 4th ed. rev. and corrected 1792) (1747 & 1751).
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From a necessary consequence of this equality, what
is permitted to one nation is permitted to all; and what is not
permitted to one is not permitted to any other. . . .
Nations being free, independent and equal, and
having a right to judge according to the dictates of
conscience, of what is to be done in order to fulfil its duties;
the effect of all this is, the producing, at least externally, and
among men, a perfect equality of rights between nations, in
the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their
pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their
conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive
judgment; so that what is permitted in one, is also permitted
in the other, and they ought to be considered in human
society as having an equal right.69
In short, “nature has established a perfect equality of rights between
independent nations.
Consequently none can naturally pretend to
prerogative: their right to freedom and sovereignty renders them equals.”70
One nation would violate another’s equality of right by claiming a
superiority of rights or a “pre-eminence of rank” over it71 or refusing to
show appropriate respect for its rights.72
The founding generation was well versed in the law of nations and
understood that free and independent states were entitled to equal
sovereignty. Thus, in declaring the Colonies to be “free and independent
States,” the founders were declaring the newly-independent American
States to be the equals not only of each other, but of all sovereign states.
Under the law of nations, states could surrender this aspect of their
sovereignty only by a clear surrender in a binding legal instrument. By
employing the term of art “States,” the Constitution necessarily recognized
the equal sovereignty of the American States. Thus, as discussed in Part IV,
the relevant inquiry is not whether the Constitution contains a provision
expressly conferring equal sovereignty on the States, but whether the
Constitution contains any provision expressly compromising the equal
sovereignty of the States.

69

1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., §§ 19-20, at 6.
Id., bk. II, § 36, at 133.
Id., bk. II, § 37, at 133.
72
Id., bk. II, § 47, at 136.
70
71
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D.

Rules Governing the Surrender of Sovereign Rights

Although states enjoyed a broad range of sovereign rights, the law
of nations recognized that a state could voluntarily modify or surrender its
rights in a treaty, convention, act, or other appropriate legal instrument.
Surrender or modification of sovereign rights was a momentous act. If a
legal instrument were misinterpreted to deny a state its rights under the law
of nations, the offended state might retaliate for any violation of its rights,
including by waging war. To avoid such misunderstandings, the law of
nations recognized a set of rules to govern the interpretation of documents
purporting to alienate sovereign rights. These rules provide important
background context for understanding the sovereign rights of American
States—and the extent to which they relinquished such rights—in the
Constitution.
Typically, states used treaties to adjust their rights under the law of
nations. For this reason, Vattel devoted an entire chapter of his treatise to
rules for interpreting treaties. As he explained, however, most of the rules
were not limited to treaties, but rather applied to “concessions, conventions,
and treaties, and . . . all contracts as well as . . . laws.”73 Vattel recognized
that established rules of interpretation were necessary to prevent a party
from taking advantage of the imperfections of language.74 He identified
two key rules of interpretation: (1) legal provisions expressed in clear and
precise terms should be interpreted according to their natural meaning
(unless they lead to absurd results), and (2) indeterminate legal provisions
should not be interpreted to alter sovereign rights in favor of one party at
the expense of the other if at all possible. These rules enabled states to
enter into agreements adjusting their sovereign rights while reducing the
chance of misunderstandings regarding such rights. The founders were well
versed in the law of nations and reasonably would have expected these rules
to govern the surrender of sovereign rights by the American “States” in the
Constitution.

73

Id. bk. II, § 262, at 215.
In any of these written legal forms, “it is impossible,” he observed, “to foresee and point out, all the
particular cases, that may arise.” Id. Because “fraud seeks to take advantage even of the imperfection of
language; that mean designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, to obtain a pretence for eluding
them upon occasion,” it is “necessary to establish rules founded on reason, and authorized by the law of nature,
capable of diffusing light over what is obscure, of determining what is uncertain, and of frustrating the attempts of
a contracting power void of good faith.” 74 Id., bk. II, § 262, at 215-16.
74
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1.

The Natural Meaning of Clear and Precise Provisions

Vattel’s first rule interpretation was that a legal act expressed in
clear and precise terms should be interpreted in accordance with its natural
meaning at the time it was adopted:
The first general maxim of interpretation is, that it is not
permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation.
When an act is conceived in clear and precise terms, when
the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can
be no reason to refuse the sense which this treaty naturally
presents.75
Vattel enumerated various related maxims of interpretation,
designed to prevent fraud. “The interpretation of every act, and of every
treaty, ought then to be made according to certain rules proper to determine
the sense of them, such as the parties must naturally have understood, when
the act was prepared and accepted.”76 One such rule was that language
generally should be understood in its common usage. “In the interpretation
of treaties, pacts, and promises, we ought not to deviate from the common
use of the language, at least, if we have not very strong reasons for it.”77
Words, he explained, are “spoken according to custom.”78
The custom of which we are speaking is, that of the time in
which the treaty, or the act in general, was concluded and
drawn up. Languages vary incessantly, and the signification
and the force of words change with time. When an ancient
act is to be interpreted, we should then know the common
use of the terms, at the time when it was written.79
Vattel described several other specific rules of interpretation, including that
technical rules should receive their technical meaning,80 that figurative
75

Id., bk. II, § 263, at 216.
Id., bk. II, § 268, at 217 (emphasis omitted).
Id., bk. II, § 271, at 219 (emphasis omitted). See also 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET
GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. V, ch. 12, § 3, at 794 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon ed. 1934)
(1688) (“About words the rule is as follows: If there is no sufficient conjecture which leads in any other direction,
words are to be understood in their proper and so-called accepted meaning, one that has been imposed upon them,
not so much by their intrinsic force and grammatical analogy as by popular usage, which is the final authority and
is the law and norm of speech.”); HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 353 (London, W. Innys, et al.
1738) (“If no Conjecture guides us otherwise, the Words are to be understood according to their Propriety, not the
grammatical one . . . but what is vulgar and most in Use . . . .).
78
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 271, at 219.
79
Id., bk. II, § 272, at 219.
80
Id., bk. II, § 276, at 220. See also PUFENDORF, supra note 77, at 795 (“As to terms used in the arts, which
the common sort scarcely comprehend, it should be observed that they are explained in accordance with the
definitions of those who are skilled in the art.); GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 353 (“Terms of Art, which the
common People are very little acquainted with, should be understood as explained by them who are most
experienced in that Art . . . .”).
76
77
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expressions should receive their figurative sense,81 and that interpretations
that lead to absurdity should be rejected.82
The goal of these interpretative rules was to find and implement the
natural, customary meaning of clear and precise terms used by sovereign
states. These rules enabled sovereign states to make treaties and take other
legal actions against a backdrop of shared interpretive rules, and thus to
adjust their sovereign rights while minimizing the chances of
misunderstanding and conflict.
2.

Surrendering or Divesting Sovereign Rights

In keeping with the goal of avoiding conflict, Vattel laid out
correlative rules to prevent the inadvertent surrender or divesting of
sovereign rights. As explained, if one sovereign expressly surrendered its
rights under the law of nations in clear and precise terms, the parties were
expected to give effect to the natural meaning of those terms. On the other
hand, if a provision was ambiguous or vague with respect to the alteration
of a state’s sovereign rights, then the parties were not to interpret it as a
surrender of such rights. For example, a nation could never surrender any
aspect of its right to self-government unless it did so in clear and express
terms. As Vattel explained:
A sovereign state cannot be constrained in this respect,
except it be from a particular right which the state itself has
given to others by treaties; and even in this case, in a subject
of such importance as that of government, this right cannot
be extended beyond the clear and express terms of the
treaties. Without this circumstance a sovereign has a right to
treat as enemies those who endeavour to interfere, otherwise
than by their good offices, in his domestic affairs.83
In other words, a state was incapable of alienating or compromising its right
to self-government by implication; any surrender of this right had to be
clear and explicit.
Accordingly, Vattel distinguished those provisions of legal
instruments that were plain, clear, and determinate from those that were
vague, unclear, or indeterminate. Vattel reiterated that “when the
dispositions of a law or a convention are plain, clear, determinate, and
applied with certainty, and without difficulty, there is no room for any

81

1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 276, at 220.
Id., bk. II, § 282, at 222.
83
Id., bk. II, § 57, at 140.
82
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interpretation, or any comment.”84 He observed, however, that “ideas” and
“language” are not always “exactly determined.”85 When the expressions of
the legislature, or of the contracting powers . . . are
indeterminate, vague, or susceptible of a more or less
expansive sense; if this precise point of their intention in the
particular case in question, cannot be observed and fixed, by
other rules of interpretation, it should be presumed,
according to the laws of reason and equity: and for this
purpose, it is necessary to pay attention to the nature of the
things to which it relates.86
In this regard, Vattel drew a sharp distinction between indeterminate
provisions relating to things that are “favorable” and indeterminate
provisions relating to things that are “odious.”87 Vattel did not use these
terms in the sense of good or bad in the abstract. Rather, he used
“favorable” to refer to things that are favorable to all interested parties, and
“odious” to refer to things that are potentially favorable to one party, and
unfavorable to the other. A “favorable” thing “tends to the common
advantage in conventions, or that has a tendency to place the contracting
powers on an equality.”88 An “odious” thing is one that “contains a
penalty,” “tends to render an act null, and without effect, either in whole or
in part, and consequently every thing that introduces any change in the
things agreed upon,” or “tends to change the present state of things.”89
In Vattel’s view, when an indeterminate provision of an act or treaty
relates to “favorable” things, “we ought to give the terms all the extent they
are capable of in common use.”90 On the other hand, when an
indeterminate provision of an act or treaty relates to “odious” things, “we
should . . . take the term in the most confined sense . . ., without going
directly contrary to the tenour of the writing, and without doing violence to
the terms.”91
84

Id., bk. II, § 300, at 232.
Id., bk. II, § 299, at 231.
86
Id., bk. II, § 300, at 232 (emphasis added).
87
Id.
88
Id., bk. II, § 301, at 232.
89
Id. The distinction between “favorable” and “odious” terms had long use among writers on the law of
nations. See PUFENDORF, supra note 77, bk. 5, ch. 12, at 806 (explaining that “odious” provisions are those
“which burden one party only, or one more than the other; also such as carry with them punishments, and which
make certain acts void, or effect some alteration in previous conclusions, as well as such as uproot friendship and
society”); GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 357 (providing as examples of “odious” provisions “those that lay the
Charge and Burden on one Party only, or on one more than another; and those which carry a Penalty along with
them, which invalidate some Acts and alter others”).
90
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 307, at 234 (emphasis omitted).
91
Id., bk. II, § 308, at 235. Pufendorf and Grotius had described these same rules of interpretation. Drawing
upon Grotius, Pufendorf wrote, “In cases not odious words are to be taken in accordance with their exact
significance in popular usage.” PUFENDORF, supra note 77, bk. 5, ch. 12, at 806. On the other hand, in odious
85

20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

Of particular relevance to the rights of the American States under
the Constitution, a provision of a treaty or other legal act was considered
“odious” if it changed the status quo by surrendering or divesting sovereign
rights previously possessed by one of the parties. Unless a legal instrument
surrendered such a right in clear and precise terms, it was to be interpreted
not to alter the pre-exisiting right. As Vattel explained:
[T]he proprietor can only lose so much of his right as he has
ceded of it; and in a case of doubt, the presumption is in
favour of the possessor. It is less contrary to equity, not to
give to a proprietor what he has lost the possession of by his
negligence, than to strip the just possessor of what lawfully
belongs to him. The interpretation then is that we ought
rather to hazard the first inconvenience, than the last. We
might apply here, to many cases, the rule . . . that the cause
of him who seeks to avoid a loss, is more favourable than
that of him who desires to acquire gain.92
In modern parlance, Vattel was describing a clear statement rule
designed to preserve pre-existing sovereign rights. In short, a legal
instrument would not be interpreted to divest a sovereign right under the
law of nations unless the instrument expressly divested that right in clear
and precise terms. This rule ensured both that states knowingly and
voluntarily surrendered their sovereign rights, and that ambiguous
provisions would not trigger disagreements that could lead to conflict, or
even war.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
State sovereignty in America began with the Declaration of
Independence. Because of their growing dissatisfaction with British rule,
the Thirteen Colonies in North America issued the Declaration on July 4,
1776. In declaring themselves to be “free and independent States,” the
Colonies chose a term of art drawn from the law of nations with an
established meaning on both sides of the Atlantic. The newly declared
“States” proceeded to fight and win a War of Independence with Great
Britain, securing their independence and sovereignty along with all of the
rights that accompanied that status under the law of nations.
cases, including those “connected with a diminution of the sovereign power,” an indeterminate provision should
be interpreted to avoid the hardship. Id. at 809. Grotius had written that “in Cases not odious must understand the
Words in their full Extent, as they are generally taken”; on the other hand, “in an odious Matter, even a figurative
Speech is allowed to avoid a Grievance.” GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 357-58.
92
1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 305, at 233-34.
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During the war, the States unanimously signed onto the Articles of
Confederation. This document was essentially a treaty among the newly
free and independent States to enhance their collective strength and
security. When the war ended, the States increasingly found the Articles to
be ineffective to meet their economic and security needs, in part because the
member States retained too much sovereignty and often ignored Congress’s
commands with impunity. Accordingly, by 1789, twelve of the original
thirteen States had abandoned the Articles of Confederation by ratifying an
entirely new Constitution to replace them, and Rhode Island did the same
by 1790. This Part examines the sovereignty enjoyed by the “States” under
the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation, and Part
III will examine their sovereignty under the Constitution.
A.

The Declaration of Independence

After reciting “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations” by
King George III against the colonies,93 the Declaration of Independence
asserted that the colonies were “free and independent states”:
these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and
Independent States; that they are absolved from all
allegiance to the British crown, and all political connection
between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to
be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states,
they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to all other acts and
things which independent states may of right do.94
This document asserted that the American States, being free and
independent, enjoyed all of the sovereign rights recognized by the law of
nations.
The powers claimed by the States in the Declaration of
Independence—“to levy war, contract alliance, establish commerce”—were
drawn directly from the law of nations. As we have explained elsewhere:
The use of the phrase, “Free and Independent States,” was a
clear reference to the law of nations. If these “United States”
achieved this status, then other nations would have to respect
their rights to prevent and vindicate injuries by other nations
(“Power to levy War” and “conclude Peace”), make treaties
(“contract Alliances” and “establish Commerce”), enjoy
93
94

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Id. para. 32.

22

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

neutral use of the high seas (“establish Commerce”), and
exercise territorial sovereignty and diplomatic rights (“all
other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right
do”).95
In short, when the “United Colonies” asserted their independence from
Great Britain, they declared themselves to be free and independent States
entitled to exercise all of the rights of sovereign states under the law of
nations.
There has been disagreement about whether the American States
became “free and independent States” individually or collectively when
they originally broke free from Great Britain.96 In other words, there has
been disagreement about whether the States were merely free and
independent of Great Britain collectively, or free and independent of each
other as well. This is an interesting theoretical question, and there have
been thoughtful arguments on both sides.97 Actual events, however,
indicate that the States understood themselves to possess individual
sovereignty following the Declaration of Independence.
First, the
Continental Congress assumed that the individual States would possess full
sovereignty following the Declaration and could unite for their common
defense only by giving their individual consent. Accordingly, just one day
after appointing a commission to draft the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress set up a separate commission to draft the Articles of
Confederation. The States regarded a treaty or compact surrendering
portions of their individual sovereignty to a central authority to be necessary
95
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV.
729, 754 (2012) [hereinafter “The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law”]. Mike Rappaport observed that “[i]n
1789, the principal meaning of the term [“state”] in this context was an independent nation or country that had
complete sovereignty.” Rappaport, supra note 18, at 830 (1999). In contrast, Jack Rakove has contended that
“[t]he word [“state”] itself was multivalent, and its various meanings shaded into one another in confusing and
even ironic ways.” JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 166 (1996). In the context of the Declaration of Independence, it seems clear that the word “state”
referred to a free and independent nation that enjoyed sovereign rights under the law of nations.
96
Compare 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 56-57 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1888) (hereinafter “ELLIOT’S DEBATES”) (“It was argued by Wilson, Robert R. Livingston, E. Rutledge,
Dickinson, and others,—. . . That, if the delegates of any particular colony had no power to declare such colony
independent, certain they were, the others could not declare it for them; the colonies being as yet perfectly
independent of each other . . . .”); with Jack N. Rakove, American Federalism: Was There an Original
Understanding, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 107, 110 (Mark R. Killenbeck, ed. 2002)
(“[T]he most persuasive story we can tell is one that emphasizes the simultaneity with which concepts of both
statehood and union emerged in the revolutionary crucible of the mid-1770s.”).
97
See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559,
1576 (2002) (stating that when the United States broke free from Great Britain, “the individual states were not
exactly thirteen separate countries”); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in
State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 584 (1994) (“During the period that preceded the framing, the states
regarded themselves and one another as sovereign states within the meaning of the law of nations . . . .”); cf.
Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U.
L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2002) (stating that “the founding generation . . . perceived the States as nation-states in some
respects and accordingly drafted constitutional text to incorporate certain useful international law rules”).
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to secure their mutual security and independence, but neither the
instrument’s precise content nor its successful adoption was a foregone
conclusion. In debating and adopting the Articles of Confederation, the
States understood each other to be separate sovereigns with complete
authority to accept or reject the plan under consideration. Moreover, the
States assumed that any State that did not ratify the Articles would not be
bound thereby.98
Second, because of concerns about how much sovereignty each
State would surrender by uniting under the Articles of Confederation, the
compact took over a year to draft and ultimately included a provision
specifying that “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated.”99 This provision made clear, if it was
not before, that each State was a separate sovereign. As discussed in the
next section, any ambiguity over whether the States possessed individual or
collective sovereignty following the Declaration of Independence was
settled by the Articles of Confederation.
B.

The Articles of Confederation

The States realized immediately that they needed to join together in
some capacity for their mutual defense and survival. The Continental
Congress established a commission to draft the Articles of Confederation in
June 1776. In November 1777, Congress approved the proposed Articles
and sent them to the individual States for ratification. The Articles took
effect in 1781 when Maryland—the last State to act—approved them. The
instrument, as understood at the time, was a compact among thirteen “free
and independent States.”100 By adopting the Articles, each State expressly
98
The same assumption carried through to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. The States sent
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and each State had one vote at the Convention. Following the
Philadelphia Convention, each State held a convention of its own to decide whether the State would ratify the new
plan. Under Article VII, only those States that ratified the Constitution were bound thereby. Thus, both before
and after the adoption of the Constitution, each State possessed individual sovereignty including the power to
accept or reject proposals to form a federal union. See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819) (“No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the states,
and of compounding the American people into one common mass.”).
99
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. II.
100
For examples of contemporaneous understandings of the Articles of Confederation as a confederation
among individual states see 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 96, at 75 (Statement of Dr. Witherspoon) (“That the
colonies should, in fact, be considered as individuals; and that, as such, in all disputes they should have an equal
vote; that they are now collected as individuals making a bargain with each other, and, of course, had a right to
vote as individuals.”); id. at 76 (Statement of John Adams) (“It has been said we are independent individuals,
making a bargain together. The question is not what we are now, but what we ought to be when our bargain shall
be made. The confederacy is to make us one individual only; it is to form us, like separate parcels of metal, into
one common mass. We shall no longer retain our separate individuality, but become a single individual, as to all
questions submitted to the confederacy.”). Even the more nationally minded James Wilson characterized the
Articles of Confederation as allowing consolidated action only with respect to those matters that the States
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surrendered some of its sovereign rights, but retained all of its remaining
sovereignty.
In keeping with Vattel’s rules governing the surrender of sovereign
rights, each State retained all the sovereign rights that it did not clearly and
expressly surrender in the Articles of Confederation. The document
memorialized this understanding in the provision declaring that “[e]ach
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power,
Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”101 The Articles’
reference to “each state” in this provision confirms that the States
understood the Articles to be a compact among thirteen separate and
independent States. Other indications of the States’ separate sovereignty
included the fact that each State appointed its own delegates to Congress,
and each State had one vote in that body (consistent with each State’s right
to sovereign equality with all others under the law of nations).
In light of these circumstances, Gordon Wood has characterized the
States as separate sovereigns who entered into a treaty of confederation for
their mutual benefit and protection:
Given the Americans’ long experience with parceling power
from the bottom up and their deeply rooted sense of each
colony’s autonomy, forming the Articles of Confederation
posed no great theoretical problems. Thirteen Independent
and sovereign states came together to form a treaty that
created a “firm league of friendship,” a collectivity not all
that different from the present-day European Union. . . .
[T]he Confederation Congress was merely a replacement for
the Crown. It possessed the Crown’s former prerogative
powers, but it could not tax or regulate commerce, as the
Crown had not had the authority to do these things either.102

referred to Congress. See id. at 78 (Statement of James Wilson) (“It is strange that annexing the name of ‘state’ to
ten thousand men, should give them an equal right with forty thousand. This must be the effect of magic, not of
reason. As to those matters which are referred to Congress, we are not so many states; we are one large state.”).
101
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. II.
102
Gordon S. Wood, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 724-25 (2011). On the other
hand, Jack Rakove has argued that “[l]ittle in the surviving records of debate and deliberation suggests that its
congressional drafters were much troubled by questions about the location of sovereignty or the nature of the
federal system.” RAKOVE, supra note 95, at 167. In his view:
Rather than agonize over the location of sovereignty in a federal system, the drafters of the
articles moved instead to adopt a fairly pragmatic and largely noncontroversial division of
powers between Congress and the states. There was broad agreement that Congress would
exercise exclusive control over the great affairs of state, war, and foreign relations, while
the states would retain exclusive control over the entire realm of ‘internal police’—the
matters of governance that involved all the ordinary aspects of domestic or municipal
legislation.”
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The individual sovereignty of the original thirteen States is
confirmed by the fact that the Articles would bind only those States that
adopted them. Had one of the States declined to ratify the Articles, no one
suggested that it would have been bound by the Articles or that its
sovereignty would have been otherwise compromised. Because each State
ratified the Articles, each State surrendered some of its sovereignty but
retained all aspects of sovereignty not expressly surrendered.
The Articles empowered Congress to act primarily in matters of war
and foreign relations and imposed certain corresponding limitations on the
States. For example, the Articles gave Congress “the sole and exclusive
right and power of determining on peace and war,” “of sending and
receiving ambassadors,” and “entering into treaties and alliances”103—all
recognized sovereign powers in “external” relations under the law of
nations.104 The Articles also gave Congress limited powers over matters of
“internal” governance, such as “the sole and exclusive right and power of
regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by
that of the respective states,” and “fixing the standards of weights and
measures throughout the United States.”105
The Articles also authorized Congress to requisition or command
each State to provide money to fund the government, and supply troops for
the armed forces in proportion to its population.106 Such requisitions were
the only means Congress had under the Articles to raise revenue and supply
the military. The Articles obligated each State to comply with these
commands by declaring that “[e]very State shall abide by the determination
of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them.”107 In practice, however, the States
frequently violated this provision by failing to comply fully with Congress’s
directives, and the Articles gave Congress no means of enforcing its
commands.
Not surprisingly, the Articles of Confederation quickly proved to be
inadequate. First, the Confederation Congress lacked certain substantive
powers necessary to secure the peace and harmony of the United States,
including the power to uphold and enforce the law of nations and treaties of
the United States,108 the power to foster and protect commerce with other
Rakove, supra note 96, at 111. Regardless of whether the founders agonized over the location of sovereignty in a
federal system, it is beyond question that the Articles delegated limited powers to the Confederation Congress and
took care to reserve to the states any powers not expressly delegated.
103
Id. art. IX.
104
See supra notes 42-56, and accompanying text.
105
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX.
106
Id.
107
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII.
108
At the start of the Federal Convention, Edmund Randolph enumerated defects in the Articles of
Confederation, including “that the confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress not
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nations,109 and the power to resolve disputes between and among the
States.110 Second, as noted, Congress lacked the power to enforce even its
limited substantive powers because it had no means of enforcing its
commands against the States. Thus, during the War of Independence,
States violated the Articles by failing to supply all of the men and revenue
requisitioned by Congress. After the War, States complied even less
frequently with requisitions, effectively leaving the central government with
no source of funds.111
As Hamilton explained in The Federalist, a “palpable defect of the
subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a sanction to its laws. The
United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or
punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a
suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional
mode.”112 Thus, he concluded, under the Articles of Confederation, “the
United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute
even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its
own laws.”113
Prior to the Constitutional Convention, James Madison served on
several commissions charged with proposing amendments to make the
Articles more effective. Madison consistently favored amending the
Articles to authorize Congress to use military force to coerce States to
comply with its commands. Congress, however, never sent this proposal to
the States. Instead, on February 21, 1787, the Confederation Congress
passed a resolution calling for a convention to revise the Articles of
Confederation. The resolution stated:
It is expedient that on the second Monday in May next a
Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by
the several States be held at Philadelphia for the sole and
being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by th[eir] own authority—Of this he cited many examples; most
of whi[ch] tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be
punished.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter
FARRAND’S RECORDS].
109
Randolph further observed at the start of the Convention that there were many advantages, which the U.S.
might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—counteraction of
the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum . . . .” Id.
110
Under the Articles, Randolph observed, “the federal government could not check the quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion in any not have constitutional power.” Id.
111
See Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 2 T HE W RITINGS OF J AMES
M ADISON 361, 364 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (stating that because acts of Congress depend “for their
execution on the will of the State legislatures,” they are “nominally authoritative, [but] in fact recommendatory
only”) [hereinafter M ADISON W RITINGS ].
112
THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
113
Id. In part, this defect resulted from the lack of a judiciary of the United States. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 22, supra note 112, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A circumstance, which crowns the defects of the
confederation, remains yet to be mentioned—the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts
to expound and define their true meaning and operation.”).
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express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation
and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such
alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in
Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal
constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the
preservation of the Union.114
The Philadelphia Convention began in May 1787 as planned, but the
delegates quickly abandoned the original goal of merely revising the
Articles of Confederation. Instead, the Convention undertook to draft and
propose an entirely new constitution that would serve as a comprehensive
replacement of the Articles.
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitutional Convention crafted a plan of government that
took a different approach than the Articles of Confederation to federal
power and state sovereignty. In the Constitution, the States surrendered
both more sovereignty overall than they had in the Articles, but they also
chose to retain certain rights they had previously surrendered in the
Articles. They surrendered more of their sovereignty by giving the United
States government more regulatory powers than the Confederation
Congress had enjoyed, including by providing the federal government with
new means to exercise those powers effectively. At the same time, the
States surrendered less of their sovereignty by withholding power from
Congress to command the States themselves. Rather than authorizing
Congress to order the States to take certain actions (as the Articles had), the
Constitution gave Congress direct power to regulate individuals—a power
withheld under the Articles.115 This change enabled Congress itself to raise
revenue and supply the armed forces without relying on the States to carry
out its commands. In addition, this change eliminated the need to adopt
more controversial measures, such as empowering Congress to use military
force to coerce state compliance with federal commands.
The fundamental shift from congressional regulation of States under
the Articles to congressional regulation of individuals under the
Constitution enabled the United States to exercise its powers more
effectively than it had under the Articles.116 The Constitution’s success in
114

Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
187 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC].
The only arguable exceptions were the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III, discussed in Part

OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185,
115

IV.

116
Of course, the Constitution contains several built-in political and procedural safeguards of federalism that
frequently render the federal government incapable of exercising its enumerated powers over individuals. See
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
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this regard, however, did not rest on the wholesale abolition of state
sovereignty. To be sure, the States surrendered significant aspects of their
sovereignty by conferring on the federal government new regulatory powers
and new means for exercising and enforcing those powers.117 Under
background principles of the law of nations governing the surrender of
sovereign rights, however, the States necessarily retained all sovereign
rights that they did not clearly and expressly surrender in the Constitution.
A.

Abandoning the Articles of Confederation

Congress charged the Philadelphia Convention with revising the
Articles of Confederation, and it is commonly acknowledged that the
Convention exceeded its mandate by abandoning the Articles in favor of an
entirely new Constitution. Indeed, some maintain that the States’ adoption
of the Constitution actually violated the Articles, which were styled the
“Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.” The Articles provided
that they “shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall
be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of
them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States,
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”118 The
States arguably violated this provision both by using a convention to
propose that the Constitution be adopted in place of the Articles, and by
adopting this change through state ratifying conventions rather than state
legislatures.
Scholars have long debated whether the States’ adoption of the
Constitution violated the Articles of Confederation,119 but the answer is of
little practical importance. Because all thirteen States ratified the
Constitution, each State exercised its sovereign prerogative to abandon the
Articles in favor the Constitution.120 Arguably, all States were free to
disregard the Articles by 1787 because many, if not all, States had violated
its terms by failing to comply with all of Congress’s commands. Under the
law of nations, when one State violated a compact or treaty, the other

117

See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII.
119
Compare Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995)
(arguing that the States’ ratification of the Constitution was “illegal”), with Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (arguing that the States
had a legal right to adopt the Constitution because of repeated violations of the Articles).
120
It is true that the States altered their compact through state ratifying conventions (rather than state
legislatures as specified in the Articles), but the founders widely understood state legislatures merely to be
exercising powers delegated by the people—the ultimate source of state sovereignty. In any event, the States’
repeated violations of the Articles released them from their obligation to comply with that instrument. See infra
notes 121–122, and accompanying text.
118
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participating States were released from their obligations and free to
withdraw.121 As Akhil Amar has explained:
[T]he Articles of Confederation were a mere treaty among
thirteen otherwise free and independent nations. That treaty
had been notoriously, repeatedly, and flagrantly violated on
every side by 1787. Under standard principles of
international law, these material breaches of a treaty freed
each party—that is, each of the thirteen states—to disregard
the pact, if it so chose. Thus, if in 1787 nine (or more) states
wanted, in effect, to secede from the Articles of
Confederation and form a new system, that was their legal
right, Article XIII notwithstanding.122
This background helps to explain why the Convention’s proposal to
abandon the Articles did not face greater opposition either at the
Convention or during the ratification debates. It also explains why each
State considered itself free to accept or reject the proposed constitution, and
why it was entirely possible that some States would decline to ratify it.
Article VII of the Constitution reflected these realities by specifying that
“[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.”123 Under this provision, the Constitution would take effect only if
at least nine States ratified it, and no State would be bound by the
Constitution unless it expressly consented through ratification. Had the
States not considered themselves to possess individual sovereignty during
the ratification era, then this provision would have made no sense. Thus,
Article VII supports the conclusion that the founders understood each State
to possess full sovereignty both to abandon the Articles and to accept or
reject the new Constitution.124
This background dispels the notion that the States had somehow
irrevocably compromised their individual sovereignty by 1787. Once it
became clear that the Articles of Confederation could no longer serve their
intended function, the States considered themselves free to consider
alternative proposals as independent sovereigns. The Convention’s debate
over whether the States should have equal suffrage in the Senate reflects
this understanding. The large States urged proportional representation in
the Senate, while the small States insisted upon equal suffrage. In this
121

See 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 200, at 214 (explaining that the breach of
a treaty gives the offended party the option to cancel the treaty).
122
Amar, supra note 119, at 1048 (footnotes omitted).
123
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
124
See supra note 98.

30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

debate, the large and small states alike considered themselves at liberty to
form new alliances with each other or even with foreign states. For
example, Gunning Bedford, representing Delaware, went so far as to
declare that if the large States dared to dissolve the confederation, “the
small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who
will take them by the hand and do them justice.”125 In danger of
disbanding, the Convention appointed a Grand Committee to break the
deadlock over the proper basis of representation in the Senate. The
Committee returned with two proposals—first, that “all Bills for raising or
appropriating money” shall originate in the House, and second, that “each
State shall have an equal Vote” in the Senate.126 Large-State delegates
James Madison (Virginia),127 Gouveneur Morris (Pennsylvania),128 and
James Wilson (Pennsylvania)129 strongly opposed this proposal as involving
no real compromise. Luther Martin, representing Maryland, responded that
“[h]e was for letting a separation take place if [the large States] desired it.
He had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any
other principle than an equality of votes in the 2d branch at least.”130 The
small States ultimately prevailed with the Convention voting five States to
four in favor of the proposals.131
This episode reveals that the individual States at the Convention
considered themselves free to pursue a wide range of options, such as
disbanding without an agreement, forming two (or more) distinct
confederacies, or even entering into alliances with foreign states if they
could not reach an acceptable arrangement with other States. That the
delegates openly discussed these options without objection indicates that the
individual States understood themselves to possess full sovereignty
unimpeded by their previous commitments under the Articles of
Confederation. If the “States” that met in Philadelphia lacked full
sovereignty to pursue all options, then these discussions made no sense.
The Articles prohibited the States, without the consent of Congress, from
either entering into “any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty” with any
foreign state, or entering into “any treaty, confederation or alliance” with

125
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 492 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
126
See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 125, at 524.
127
Id. at 527.
128
Id. at 551.
129
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 125, at 4.
130
Id.
131
See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 125, at 15.
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any other American State.132 The debate over equal suffrage reveals that
the States at the Convention did not consider themselves bound by these—
or any other—restrictions on their individual sovereignty.
Indeed, Article VII underscores this understanding by providing that
the Constitution would be binding only upon those “States so ratifying the
Same.”133 Article VII’s reference to “States” thus referred to States with
full sovereignty to accept or reject the proposed Constitution. Because the
proposed Constitution used the identical term “States” without qualification
throughout the document, Article VII confirms that the Constitution used
the term to describe free and independent States with full sovereignty. Of
course, the proposed Constitution also contained numerous clear and
express surrenders of sovereign rights that would necessarily diminish the
sovereignty of those States that elected to ratify it, but those surrenders
occurred by virtue of ratification rather than any pre-ratification surrender.
As explained, a sovereign could not surrender its rights under the law of
nations without adopting clear and express terms to that effect in a treaty or
other legal instrument. By ratifying the Constitution, each State voluntarily
surrendered some—but not all—of its pre-existing sovereignty.134 Thus,
following ratification, each “State” possessed the rights of free and
independent States minus only those rights that it had clearly and expressly
given up in the Constitution.
This conclusion is not contradicted by the founders’ understanding
that ultimate sovereignty rested with the people. As the Preamble states, the
Constitution was ordained and established by “We the People of the United
States.”135 At first glance, popular sovereignty might seem inconsistent
with the sovereignty of the individual States. If “the People of the United
States” ordained and established the Constitution, then why did Article VII
permit each State to opt out by failing to ratify the instrument? Any
apparent conflict between the Preamble and Article VII disappears once one
recalls that prior to the Civil War “Americans understood ‘the United
States’ to be a plural noun and used it to refer collectively to the several

132

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. VI.
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
This approach to sovereignty was consistent with Vattel’s writings. See ALISON L. LECROIX, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 79 (2010) (“Vattel’s theories provided a normative vision of
multiplicity, positing that a ‘republic of republics’ could be capable of operating as a ‘sovereign among
sovereigns.’”).
135
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
133
134
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states.”136 Thus, at the founding, “the United States” were a “they,” not an
“it.”137
James Madison shared this view. In The Federalist No. 39, Madison
reconciled any tension between the relevant provisions as follows:
it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded
on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given
by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other,
that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people,
not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as
composing the distinct and independent States to which they
respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of
the several States, derived from the supreme authority in
each State, the authority of the people themselves.138
Madison made clear that “the people of the United States” referred not to
one undifferentiated mass, but to the people of each independent State
ratifying the Constitution. As he explained, “the act of the people, as
forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation,
is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the
decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a
majority of the States.”139
Rather, “[e]ach State, in ratifying the
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others,
and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.”140 The actual ratification
process confirmed Madison’s understanding. Rather than participating in a
national convention, each State convened a distinct convention (as required
by Article VII) for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting the proposed
Constitution on its own behalf.141
136
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Why Federal Courts Apply the Law of Nations Even Though it
is Not the Supreme Law of the Land, 106 GEO. L.J. 1915, 1929 (2018).
137
This usage persisted at least through the Civil War Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1
(“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)).
138
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 112, at 253-54 (James Madison)
139
Id. at 254.
140
Id. Even if one believed (counterfactually) that the Constitution was adopted by the undifferentiated
“people of the United States,” the Constitution would still be subject to the same rule of interpretation—namely,
the instrument could alienate the pre-existing sovereign rights of the States only through clear and express terms.
Under the law of nations, no legal instrument would be read to interfere with the sovereign rights of a state unless
the instrument sought to do so in clear and express terms. The same rules of interpretation applied to an
involuntary divestiture of sovereign rights as applied to a voluntary one, and thus the same rules would apply to
the interpretation of the Constitution even if it had been forced upon the States by an undifferentiated popular
majority of the United States.
141
Like Article VII, Article V of the Constitution permits each State to decide for itself whether to ratify new
constitutional proposals. Unlike Article VII, however, Article V permits a supermajority of States to bind
nonconsenting States. As Henry Monaghan has explained, however, the States surrendered their right
individually to veto constitutional amendments “only on the premise that Article V’s requirements would make it
very difficult to change the terms according to which the states came together.” Henry Paul Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 129 (1996).
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In sum, the Constitution did not use the term “State” in a new or
unknown sense. By continuing to use the term “States,” the Constitution
referred to the sovereign and independent American States described in the
Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. Such States
could alienate their rights under the law of nations only if a they
surrendered them in a binding legal instrument through clear and express
terms.
B.

Residual State Sovereignty

Of course, the law of nations allowed free and independent States to
surrender parts of their sovereignty voluntarily, and the American States did
so in the Constitution. Thus, following ratification, the “States” referred to
in the Constitution possessed full sovereignty minus those specific rights
they clearly and expressly surrendered in the document.
Not surprisingly, the predominant understanding of the Constitution
during its drafting and ratification was that all powers not delegated to the
federal government were necessarily reserved to the States. Initially at
least, this understanding was not the product of the Tenth Amendment.
Rather, this understanding pre-dated the Amendment and stemmed from a
relatively straightforward application of principles drawn from the law of
nations. As discussed, sovereign states could alienate aspects of their
sovereignty only by making clear and express surrenders in an appropriate
instrument. Accordingly, the States necessarily retained all aspects of their
sovereignty that they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution. The
Tenth Amendment merely confirmed—rather than created—this
understanding of state sovereignty.142
George Washington’s letter of September 17, 1787, transmitting the
Constitution to Congress, reflects this understanding. He described the new
charter as an allocation of particular sovereign rights to the United States

Accordingly, Professor Monaghan rejected the claim, made by Akhil Amar, that a national majority of “We the
People” can amend the Constitution outside of the requirements of Article V. See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994)
142
As many commentators have observed, the Tenth Amendment differed from a comparable provision of
the Articles of Confederation by omitting the word “expressly.” The Articles provided that “[e]ach state retains
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
OF 1777, art. II. By contrast, the Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
U.S. CONST. amend. X. In our view, the omission of the word “expressly” was a conscious and significant change
by the founders, but it does not alter the meaning of the term “States” in the Constitution. The primary effect of
this omission was to allow Congress to employ incidental means to execute its enumerated powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The precise scope of Congress’s incidental powers remains contested, but here
again the law of nations provides some guidance. See infra Part III.D.4.
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government, and a reservation of the remaining “rights of independent
sovereignty” to the States:
It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of
these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to
each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all.
Individuals entering into society must give up a share of
liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice
must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the
object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with
precision the line between those rights which must be
surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and, on the
present occasion, this difficulty was increased by a
difference among the several states as to their situation,
extent, habits, and particular interests . . . .143
Hamilton and Madison based their defense of the Constitution in
The Federalist on the same understanding of divided sovereignty. They
sought to allay the fears of Anti-Federalists that the Constitution could lead
to a consolidated government because it did not provide sufficient
safeguards for maintaining the reserved powers of the States against
overreaching by the federal government.144
As Madison famously
explained in The Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the
most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.145
143

1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 96, at 17.
As Jack Rakove has explained, “[i]f Anti-Federalists could be polled, then, as to whether they thought
that the original Constitution of 1787 adequately secured the reserved powers of the states, the logic of their
position would have compelled them to answer in the negative. Their original understanding of the Constitution
was that it was a formula for consolidation, perhaps immediately, certainly over time.” Rakove, supra note 96, at
122. .
145
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 112, at 313 (James Madison). Madison repeated this description of
the federal structure in others papers. For example, Madison explained in The Federalist No. 14:
144

[I]t is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated
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Hamilton provided a similar description of residual state sovereignty in the
course of rejecting claims that Article III would permit individuals to sue
States:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This is the general sense, and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely
ideal.146
Hamilton denied that the Constitution contained such a surrender of
sovereign immunity by recalling “[t]he circumstances which are necessary
to produce an alienation of State sovereignty.”147 He directed the reader to
an earlier essay in which he described “the rule that all authorities, of which
the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with
them in full vigor.”148 Applying this rule, he concluded: “A recurrence to
the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no color to
pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be
divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free
from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good
faith.”149
In explaining the Constitution in these terms, Hamilton and Madison
relied on background rules drawn from the law of nations governing the
interpretation of legal instruments claimed to divest sovereign rights.
Specifically, they invoked the principles, described by Vattel, that a legal
instrument should not be interpreted to divest sovereign powers or violate
sovereign rights unless the legal instrument did so clearly and expressly. In
accordance with these principles, they explained that the federal
objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by
the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments which can extend their care to
all those other objects, which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority
and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish the governments of
the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objections, though it
would not be difficult to shew that if they were abolished, the general government would be
compelled by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper
jurisdiction.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 112, at 86 (James Madison).
146
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) .
147
Id. at 549
148
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
149
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton).
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government would possess only those sovereign powers the States clearly
and expressly surrendered in the Constitution, and the States would
necessarily retain all other rights and powers not surrendered. In The
Federalist No. 32, Hamilton invoked this principle in describing the effect
of the delegation of powers to the federal government upon the sovereign
powers of the States. He explained that the Constitution’s allocation of
powers to the federal government did not divest the States of any preexisting sovereign rights except where its language did so in express terms.
It is worth quoting Hamilton at length on this point:
But as the plan of the convention aims only at a
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to
the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this
alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited
the States from exercising the like authority; and where it
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant. . . .
It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience
in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional
repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a
pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain
cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and
the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not
explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them
in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division,
but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument
which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution.150
In this passage, Hamilton understood the Constitution not to divest the
States of sovereign power except (1) where it did so in express terms, or (2)
where a state power “would be absolutely and totally repugnant” to the
powers expressly granted to the federal government by the Constitution.151
150

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 200, 202-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (first emphasis added).
As Kurt Lash has observed, it was advocates of the Constitution, seeking to allay Anti-Federalist
concerns, who insisted that the federal government could exercise only those powers expressly delegated to it.
151
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This understanding tracks Vattel’s approach to the interpretation of legal
instruments that sought to alter sovereign rights and powers.152
A threshold inquiry at the Constitution Convention was whether the
Constitution should follow the Articles of Confederation and authorize
Congress to commandeer the States, and—if so—whether the Constitution
should grant Congress additional power to use military force to coerce state
compliance with such commands. At the outset of the Convention, James
Madison favored giving Congress power both to commandeer and to coerce
the States, as evidenced by the Virginia Plan. The Plan initially proposed
that that “the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise
of individual Legislation.”153 In addition, to make Congress’s power to
commandeer States effective, the Virginia Plan also proposed that the
National Legislature be empowered “to call forth the force of the Union
agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles
thereof.”154
The proposal to allow Congress to use military force against States
raised alarms among the delegates. For example, George Mason argued
that coercion and punishment could not be used against the States
collectively.155 For these reasons, Mason argued that “such a Govt. was
necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those
only whose guilt required it.”156 In response to these remarks, Madison
“observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he
doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to
people collectively and not individually.”157 Thus, Madison moved to
postpone the initial proposal to give Congress power to coerce States, and
expressed the hope “that such a system would be framed as might render
this recourse unnecessary.”158 Ultimately, the Convention decided to
abandon Congress’s power to command States in favor of giving Congress
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict
Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1593-97 (2009).
152
See id. at 1639-40 (discussing the relationship between early arguments over constitutional interpretation
and rules of interpretation under the law of nations).
153
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 21.
154
Id.
155
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 33, 34.
156
Id.
157
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
158
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
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power to regulate individuals instead. By withholding power from
Congress to command the States, the Convention eliminated the need to
give Congress power to enforce such commands. As Mason explained:
“Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States not the
people of the States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals.
The case will be changed in the new plan of Govt.”159 In the end,
Madison agreed that regulation of individuals was superior to trying
to perfect congressional regulation of States: “Any Govt. for the U.
States formed on the supposed practicability of using force agst. the
<unconstitutional proceedings> of the States, wd. prove as visionary &
fallacious as the Govt. of Congs. [under the Articles of Confederation].”160
The delegates at the Convention viewed the question of how the
federal government could most effectively exercise its powers as a binary
choice: either authorize Congress to command States and use military force
to coerce their compliance with such commands, or adopt an entirely new
Constitution in which Congress would regulate individuals instead of
States. In choosing the latter course, the founders chose not to grant
Congress power to command or coerce the States in the new Constitution.
As discussed in Part IV, by failing to authorize Congress to command or
coerce States, the States surrendered less of their sovereignty than they had
under the Articles of Confederation. On the other hand, the States
surrendered—for the first time—a fundamental aspect of their sovereignty
by authorizing Congress to regulate the individuals within the territorial
limits of the States.
C.

The Powers Delegated to the Federal Government

The Articles of Confederation delegated important powers to “the
United States, in Congress assembled,” but required Congress to rely on the
States to carry out its commands. As discussed, the Constitution took an
entirely different approach. The Constitution gave Congress power to
regulate individuals directly rather than power to regulate through
commands issued to the States. In this way, the States expressly
surrendered a significant aspect of their sovereignty in the Constitution that
they had not surrendered in the Articles of Confederation, while
simultaneously withholding congressional power to command and coerce
States. Thus, the Constitution divested the States of their pre-existing
sovereign rights in two important ways: (1) by granting the federal
159
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 132, 133.
160
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 164, 165 (footnote omitted). This debate is described in greater detail in Part IV.B.

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860

government new and important regulatory and foreign relations powers; and
(2) by authorizing the federal government to exercise its regulatory powers
directly upon individuals within the territorial jurisdiction of the States.
First, the Constitution not only transferred many of the powers of
the Confederation Congress under the Articles to the new federal
government, but also conferred new and important powers on the federal
government. Most of the federal powers that the Constitution continued
from the Articles concerned the external relations of the United States. As
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 23, “[t]he principal purposes to
be answered by Union are these—The common defence of the members—
the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as
external attacks—the regulation of commerce with other nations and
between States—the superintendence of our intercourse, political and
commercial, with foreign countries.”161 In this realm, the Constitution
granted the federal government roughly the same powers to conduct foreign
relations and decide matters of war and peace that the Articles had granted
to the Confederation Congress.162
Specifically, the Constitution gave Congress and the President
powers to conduct diplomatic relations with other nations, including power
to the President to “to make Treaties” subject to concurrence of two-thirds
of the Senate,163 to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls” subject consent of a majority of the Senate,164 and power to
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”165 The Constitution also
empowered Congress “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”166 and
“[t]o raise and support Armies . . . and [t]o provide and maintain a
Navy”167; and assigned responsibility to the President to serve as
“Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.168 In addition, the Constitution
gave Congress some of the same powers over internal matters that the
Articles had given the Confederation Congress, such as power “[t]o coin
Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the
Standard of Weights and Measures.”169

161

THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 112, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton).
For more extensive discussions of these powers, see ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK,
THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-67 (2017); Bellia & Clark, The Law of Nations as
Constitutional Law, supra note 95, at 764-779.
163
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
164
Id.
165
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
166
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
167
Id.
168
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
169
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
162
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But the Constitution also granted the federal government new
express powers to regulate various matters that the Articles had not
entrusted to the Confederation Congress. For example, the Constitution
enabled the federal government to redress U.S. violations of the law of
nations and treaties in more effective ways, including by creating federal
courts and empowering Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations.”170 The Constitution also granted Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”171 Perhaps most importantly, the Constitution
granted Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”172 In granting the
federal government these new powers, the States ceded more sovereignty
than they had in the Articles of Confederation.
The second respect in which the states transferred more sovereignty
under the Constitution than they had under the Articles was by giving
Congress novel power to regulate individuals within the territory of the
States. The Articles of Confederation contained no such surrender of this
aspect of state sovereignty. Under the law of nations, a free and
independent state had exclusive territorial sovereignty to govern individuals
within its territory, and any attempt by another sovereign to regulate such
individuals would have violated its sovereignty and given it just cause for
war. By expressly authorizing the federal government to regulate
individuals within their borders, the States compromised this aspect of their
sovereignty. Given its novelty and importance to the success of the
Constitution, the States’ decision to share their exclusive power to regulate
individuals within their territories was arguably their most significant
surrender of sovereignty in the Constitution.
Once the Constitutional Convention made the fundamental decision
to shift from congressional regulation of States to congressional regulation
of individuals, the delegates had to design a federal government capable of
enforcing such regulations on its own (lest they again leave the federal
government dependent on the States with no effective means of
enforcement). Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government
consisted primarily of a Congress of the States, with no real executive or

170

Id.
Id. Vattel had described both of these powers as sovereign powers belonging to states under the law of
nations. See supra note 64, and accompanying text.
172
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
171
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judicial powers of its own.173 Within this structure, Congress had to rely on
state legislative, executive, and judicial officers to carry out its commands.
Under the new Constitution, the federal government would have its own
legislative, executive, and judicial branches to implement the exercise of
federal powers. Of course, this arrangement would permit the federal
government and the States to exercise concurrent authority over the same
individuals in certain circumstances. The States amplified the significance
of this concession by adopting the Supremacy Clause, which provided that
the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties constituted
the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding contrary state law. When
conflicts arose, the Supremacy Clause required state courts to apply valid
federal laws over state law. And the Constitution gave federal courts
corresponding power to uphold the supremacy of federal law pursuant to the
Arising Under Clause of Article III.
D.

The Powers Surrendered by the States

In allocating powers to the federal government in the Constitution,
the States surrendered or compromised portions of their sovereignty by
making four kinds of delegations of power to the federal government: (1)
express delegations of exclusive power to the federal government; (2)
express delegations of power to the federal government coupled with
express prohibitions on the States’ exercise of the same power; (3) express
delegations of power to the federal government not accompanied by express
prohibitions on the States; and (4) delegation of incidental powers to the
federal government. The fourth category is the most controversial and is
the one that has given rise to many of the Supreme Court’s most prominent
federalism decisions. This section will briefly describe each of these four
ways in which the States surrendered portions of their sovereignty in the
Constitution. Part IV will discuss three important federalism doctrines that
relate to the fourth category.
As explained, Alexander Hamilton discussed in The Federalist No.
32 the first three ways in which states surrendered sovereignty in the
Constitution. In his discussion, he relied on the principle drawn from the
law of nations that legal instruments should not be interpreted to alienate
sovereign rights and powers unless the text of the instrument did so clearly
and expressly.174 Some surrenders were complete in that they granted the
federal government exclusive power to regulate certain matters. Other
173
The Articles of Confederation did establish a federal tribunal with limited jurisdiction to hear “the trial of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and . . . appeals in all cases of captures.” ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1777 art. IX, § 1.
174
See supra note 150, and accompanying text.
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surrenders were partial in that they granted the federal government
concurrent power to regulate certain matters. In either case, Hamilton
assured opponents of ratification that the Constitution would not divest the
States of any aspect of their pre-existing sovereignty except when it did so
(1) “in express terms,” or (2) when a state power “would be absolutely and
totally repugnant” to powers that Constitution expressly allocated to the
United States government.175
This understanding accords with the
principles Vattel described to govern the interpretation of legal instruments
altering sovereign rights and powers.176
1.

Express Delegations of Exclusive Federal Power

The first category—express delegations of exclusive power to the
federal government—provides a clear example of the surrender of sovereign
rights by the States. The Constitution makes certain express allocations of
exclusive power to the federal government. For example, the Constitution
gives Congress exclusive authority to govern certain territorial enclaves of
importance to the federal government. Specifically, the Constitution grants
Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the

175

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton).
It is important to note that this approach to interpretation differs from a “strict construction” approach.
The rules of interpretation that Vattel described were more nuanced. The conventional account is that strict
constructionists, such as Thomas Jefferson and St. George Tucker, believed that the words of the Constitution
should be strictly construed against federal power, see The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 536 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003) (arguing that the powers delegated to Congress in the
Constitution should be strictly construed to avoid the federal government from assuming unlimited powers); 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. Note D at 155
(St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (arguing that the powers
delegated to the federal government should be strictly construed); while others, such as John Marshall, believed
that the words of the Constitution should be given their ordinary or natural import. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-88 (1824) (rejecting strict construction and arguing instead that the Constitution should be
interpreted in accord with the natural sense of its words); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at § 411 (Lawbook Exch. 2001) (1833) (also rejecting and refuting the
theory of strict construction). Over time, the conventional account goes, the ordinary meaning approach prevailed
over strict constructionism. See Kurt Lash, Tucker’s Rule: St. George Tucker and the Limited Construction of
Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 (2006) (describing this account).
The lines of debate, however, in early constitutional interpretations were more nuanced than this story
suggests. Vattel’s principles of interpretation for legal instruments allocating sovereign powers—whether they be
treaties, compacts, conventions, constitutions, legislative acts, or other legal instruments—included elements of
both ordinary meaning and strict construction. First, he explained that the clear and express terms of a legal
instrument should be given their ordinary or natural meaning. See supra notes 75-82, and accompanying text.
Second, he explained that terms of a legal instrument that were vague or indeterminate should be interpreted
against divesting a sovereign state of its preexisting rights. See supra notes 83-92, and accompanying text. As we
explain in this Article, early explanations of the Constitution and judicial practice more closely align with Vattel’s
approach than with any categorical acceptance of either a strict construction or an ordinary meaning approach to
constitutional interpretation.
176
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Seat of the Government of the United States.”177 The same clause gives
Congress power “to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings.”178 Through these clauses, the States gave Congress complete
power—exclusive of state authority—to govern places of special
significance to the federal government.
2.

Express Delegations with Express Prohibitions

In the second category, the Constitution includes several express
delegations of power to the federal government accompanied by express
prohibitions on the exercise of the same powers by the States. Taken
together, these provisions necessarily give the federal government exclusive
power to regulate the matters in question. As explained, in the realm of
“external relations,” the Constitution grants the federal political branches
several express powers to conduct foreign relations and decide matters of
war and peace.179 In addition to allocating these powers to the federal
government, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the
States from exercising almost all of these powers. For example, the
Constitution gives the President power “to make Treaties” with other
nations subject to concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate,180 and elsewhere
expressly provides that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,” or “enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a
foreign Power.”181 Likewise, the Constitution gives Congress power to
“[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water,”182 and “[t]o raise and support
Armies . . . and [t]o provide and maintain a Navy”183; and assigns
responsibility to the President to serve as “Commander in Chief” of the
armed forces.184 Elsewhere, the Constitution expressly provides that the
States may not “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” or “keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”185
The Constitution also grants the federal government express
authority over certain “internal” matters while expressly prohibiting the
177

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
Id.
179
See supra notes 161-170, and accompanying text.
180
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
181
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
182
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
183
Id.
184
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
185
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
178
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States from exercising the same authority. For example, the Constitution
gives Congress the power “[t]o coin Money,”186 but expressly forbids the
States to do so.187 Similarly, the Constitution grants Congress “power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,188 while simultaneously
prohibiting the States from exercising the same powers in limited
circumstances. Specifically, the Constitution provides that a State may not,
“without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports
or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection Laws.”189
In all cases in which the Constitution delegates an express power to
the federal government and imposes an express prohibition on the States,
the States have clearly and expressly surrendered complete sovereignty to
the federal government over the matters in question. Because they are clear
and explicit, these surrenders have generated few controversies in the
Supreme Court.190
3.

Express Delegations Without Express Prohibitions

The third category consists of instances in which the Constitution
expressly delegates powers to the federal government but does not
expressly prohibit them to the States. The Supreme Court has not treated
these instances in a uniform manner. On some occasions, the Court treats
such delegations to the federal government as exclusive of state authority,
effectively interpreting the States’ surrender of sovereignty as complete. In
these cases, the Court regards the States’ exercise of the power in question
to be irreconcilable with its exercise by the federal government. On other
occasions, the Court treats such delegations to the federal government as
non-exclusive, allowing States to continue to exercise concurrent authority
over the same matters. This category of federal power presents difficult
186

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
188
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
189
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
190
As the next section explains, controversies have arisen when litigants seek to oust state authority on the
basis of provisions that do not do so expressly. For example, in 1833 the Court considered whether the Bill of
Rights operated as a limitation on state power. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Court held
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States because the Constitution limits state power only where it does so
expressly:
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers
of the State governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution,
and have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation
of improving the Constitutions of the several States by affording the people additional
protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which
concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible
language.
Id. at 250. Thus, in accordance with well-established rules governing the surrender of sovereign rights under the
law of nations, the Court held that the restrictions in Bill of Rights do not apply to the States.
187
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interpretive questions, and we do not attempt to resolve them here. Rather,
for present purposes, we simply describe this category and how it has been
understood historically.
a. Exclusive Federal Authority by Unavoidable Implication
Some delegations of power to the federal government are regarded
as necessarily exclusive of state authority even though the Constitution does
not say they are exclusive or expressly prohibit the States from exercising
the same power. For instance, Article IV grants Congress the power “to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”191 Nothing in
the Constitution expressly prohibits the States from regulating the territories
or property of the United States. By necessary implication, however, this
congressional power is generally thought to be exclusive because the
exercise of concurrent state authority in such cases is thought to be
incompatible with federal authority. Similarly, Article II provides that the
President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States.”192 The Constitution does not expressly prohibit the
States from appointing federal officers and judges, but almost no one would
suggest that the Constitution leaves the States free to do so.
The same provision of Article II that grants the President power to
appoint judges and other officers of the United States grants the President
power to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,”
subject to the consent of the Senate.193 Article II also gives the President
the power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”194
Although the Constitution does not expressly prohibit States from
appointing and receiving ambassadors, there is good reason to believe that
the Supreme Court would find these federal powers to be exclusive of state
authority.
First, the States have little need to send and receive ambassadors.
Ambassadors represent sovereign states and enable them to conduct
diplomatic relations and negotiations. The Constitution expressly disables
States from making treaties, waging war, and exercising other diplomatic
prerogatives, such as laying imposts or duties, issuing letters or marque and
reprisal, forming alliances, or making any agreement or compact
whatsoever with a foreign nation. Because all of these diplomatic
191

U.S. CONST. art. IV.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
194
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
192
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prerogatives are allocated exclusively to the United States, the States have
little need to exchange ambassadors with foreign nations.
Second, sending and receiving ambassadors is one of the primary
ways in which nations have historically recognized each other’s separate
sovereignty and independence under the law of nations. The Supreme
Court has long held that the power to recognize foreign nations is an
exclusive federal power. Recognition, as the Supreme Court recently
explained, “is a ‘formal acknowledgment’ that a particular ‘entity possesses
the qualifications for statehood’ or ‘that a particular regime is the effective
government of a state,’” and “may also involve the determination of a
state’s territorial bounds.”195 States have no power to recognize foreign
nations because, in the Court’s view, such power would be incompatible
with the Constitution’s allocation of the recognition power to the federal
government.196
Regardless of the merits of such examples, they illustrate that the
Court sometimes finds a specific allocation of power to the federal
government to be exclusive of the exercise of the same power by the States
even though the Constitution contains no express prohibition on the States.
The Court appears to have rested such decisions on the assumption that the
States’ exercise of the same powers assigned to federal officials would be
fundamentally inconsistent—or irreconcilable—with their exercise by the
federal government.
b. Concurrent Federal and State Authority
In other instances, the Supreme Court has understood express
delegations of power to the federal government to allow concurrent exercise
of the same powers by the States. In these instances, the Constitution does
not prevent the federal government and the States from regulating the same
matters at the same time in the same territory. For example, under Article I,
Congress has power “To lay and collect Taxes,” to spend for “the general
welfare,” and “to borrow Money.”197 The Constitution does not expressly
or by unavoidable implication prohibit States from exercising these same
powers within their respective jurisdictions, and indeed the States have
195
Zivitofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a, p. 84 (Am. Law Inst. 1986)).
196
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“The action of New York in this case amounts in
substance to a rejection of a part of the policy underlying recognition by this nation of the Soviet Union. Such
power is not accorded a State in our constitutional system.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 203, 332 (1937)
(reasoning that no state power “can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of federal constitutional
power” to recognize the Soviet Union). The Supreme Court went a step further in Zivitofsky when it held that the
President has the sole power under the Constitution to recognize foreign nations, exclusive not only of States but
also of Congress. See Zivitofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (holding that “the power to recognize or decline to recognize
a foreign state and its territorial bounds resides in the President alone”).
197
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2.
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continuously exercised these powers since the Constitution was adopted.
Unlike the recognition power described above, the exercise of taxing and
spending powers by a State is not incompatible with the exercise of the
same powers by the federal government. As Hamilton explained in The
Federalist No. 32, the power to tax (except imports and exports) “is
manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in
the individual States.”198
Hamilton gave two reasons for this conclusion that accorded with
the rules supplied by the law of nations for ascertaining when a state had
surrendered a sovereign right. First, Hamilton explained that no provision
of the Constitution expressly divested the States of the general power to tax.
“There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that
power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence
which prohibits the States from exercising it.”199 Second, Hamilton
explained that the Constitution’s express provisions empowering Congress
to tax and spend do not give rise to an unavoidable implication of
exclusivity that divests the States of their sovereign power to exercise the
same powers. True, he explained, a state tax on a particular power might be
“inexpedient” for the Union, but that was not enough for the Constitution to
divest a State of power by implication. For a legal instrument to divest a
State of power by implication, there must be a “direct contradiction of
power” or an “immediate constitutional repugnancy” between an express
federal power and the exercise of the same power by the States: “It is not,
however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but
an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and
extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.”200
198

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
200
Id. In United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251 (1805), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invoked The
Federalist No. 32 to conclude that Congress’s authority to give itself priority as a tax creditor was not exclusive of
a State’s authority to give itself such priority. The question Nichols was whether a 1797 Act of Congress
providing that “debts due to the United States, shall be first satisfied” extended to cases where a State held a prior
lien. Id. at 251. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed both whether the Act of Congress should be read
to extend to cases where a State held a lien and whether Congress had power under the Constitution to take
priority over a State as creditor. On the constitutional question, Justice Yeates applied the same method of
analysis as the Justices had in Chisholm, explaining the Constitution should not be read to divest States of their
antecedent sovereign rights absent express language to that effect:
199

[I]t is a maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be deprived of any of their
rights by implication, nor in any manner whatever, but by their own voluntary consent, or
by submission to a conqueror. It would certainly require strong, clear, marked expressions,
to satisfy a reasonable mind, that the constituted authorities of the union contemplated by
any public law, the devesting of any pre-existing right or interest in a state; or that the
representatives of any state would have agreed thereto, even supposing the legitimate
powers of congress in such particular, to be perfectly ascertained and settled. . . . Hence it
results that congress have the concurrent right of passing laws to protect the interest of the
United States arising from the public revenue; but in so doing, they cannot detract from the
uncontroulable power of individual states to raise their own revenue, nor infringe on, or
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John Marshall endorsed Hamilton’s understanding in Gibbons v.
Ogden:
The power of taxation is indispensable to their existence, and
is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in,
and being exercised by, different authorities at the same
time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different
purposes, in different hands. Taxation is the simple operation
of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating
mass, susceptible of almost infinite division, and a power in
one to take what is necessary for certain purposes is not, in
its nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what
is necessary for other purposes. Congress is authorized to lay
and collect taxes, &c. to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States.
This does not interfere with the power of the States to tax for
the support of their own governments, nor is the exercise of
that power by the States an exercise of any portion of the
power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes
for State purposes, they are not doing what Congress is
empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of
the States.201
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court has sometimes held
that certain constitutional allocations of power to the federal government are
exclusive even though the Constitution does not expressly make them
exclusive or expressly prohibit States from exercising them (such as the
power to recognize foreign nations). On other occasions, however, the
Court has determined that certain constitutional allocations of power to the
federal government (such as the power to tax) are not exclusive of state
authority because concurrent authority is not incompatible with the
allocation of the power in question to the federal government.
4.

Delegation of Incidental Federal Power

The fourth category of federal power involves the States’ delegation
of incidental powers to the federal government. As discussed, the States
surrendered important aspects of their sovereignty in the Constitution,
derogate from the sovereignty of any independent state. Federalist Letters, No. 32, 33. The
consequences of a contrary doctrine are too obvious to be insisted upon.
Id. at 258-59 (Opinion of Yeates, J.).
201
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824).
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perhaps most significantly by granting Congress various enumerated
powers to tax and regulate individuals within the territory of the States.
Rather than attempting to spell out all of the means by which Congress
could exercise these powers, the Constitution included the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which gives Congress catch-all authority to make “all laws
which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all others powers vested by this constitution, in the
government of the United States, or in any department thereof.”202 In
McCulloch v. Maryland,203 the Supreme Court interpreted the Clause to
permit Congress to incorporate a bank as an incidental means of carrying
into execution its “great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money;
to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and
support armies and navies.”204 In the course of its opinion, the Court
explained that Congress has broad discretion to select the means by which
the federal government pursues the ends entrusted to it by the Constitution.
Critics of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism doctrines
maintain that the Court has unduly restricted Congress’s choice of means
under the Necessary and Proper Clause by invalidating federal statutes that
violate certain aspects of state sovereignty. For example, in an important
article, John Manning argues that the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution suggest that “the Court should defer to Congress’s reasonable
judgments under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”205 He maintains that in
recent federalism decisions, the Court has taken it upon itself to judge the
propriety of Congress’s chosen means by reference to its own conceptions
of federalism unmoored from the constitutional text. Manning points to the
Court’s anti-commandeering decision in Printz v. United States as the
“archetype of the Court’s new structuralism.”206 He notes that the issue
involved in the case was not whether “Congress had the power to regulate
the purchase and sale of firearms,”207 but rather “whether Congress could
do so by means of commandeering state officials to implement the law.”208
Manning argues that the Court should have deferred to Congress’s preferred
choice of means in Printz because “the Constitution says nothing” one way
or the other about commandeering.209

202

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
204
Id. at 407.
205
John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2014).
206
Id. at 34.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See id. at 36. Although Dean Manning has argued in favor of broad deference to Congress’s choice of
means under the Necessary and Proper Clause, he does acknowledge the possibility that “support for some of the
Court’s [federalism] holdings [may] remain[] to be found in parts of the historical record it has yet to explore.”
203
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As discussed, however, mere constitutional silence gives Congress
no authority to override the pre-existing sovereign rights of the States.
Rather, under principles of the law of nations well known to the founders,
“States” could alienate their sovereign rights only by expressly surrendering
them in a formal legal instrument. Proponents of broad federal power might
respond that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be considered just
such a surrender. The difficulty with this claim, however, is that all
surrenders of sovereign rights had to be clear and express, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause is notoriously indeterminate.
Courts and commentators have long debated the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. For example, Gary Lawson and Patricia
Granger have argued that “the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although
previously largely unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring
executory laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain or jurisdiction—
that is, by requiring that such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional
powers of any federal institutions or infringe on the retained rights of the
states or of individuals.”210 Other scholars, however, have rejected such
restrictions. For example, Randy Beck has argued that the “propriety”
limitation of the Clause is best understood as requiring an appropriate
relationship between congressional ends and means but does not support a
state sovereignty restriction of the kind imposed in Printz.211
More recently, several scholars have published a book attempting to
recover lost usages and meanings of the phrase “necessary and proper.”212
Robert Natelson suggests that the phrase incorporates fiduciary obligations
derived from trust law, including reasonableness, impartiality, good faith,
and due care.213 Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman conclude that the Clause
reflects standards of “reasonableness” imported from English administrative
law, including fairness, proportionality, and respect for pre-existing
rights.214 Finally, Geoffrey Miller observes that the language of the Clause
has ties to the language of eighteenth-century corporate charters, and
suggests that the Clause requires a “reasonably close connection” between
means and ends and seeks to avoid discrimination among stakeholders.215
See id. at 80 & n.454 (citing Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1817 (2010), and Rappaport, supra note 18.).
210
Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
211
See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
581.
212
See GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, AND GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (Cambridge, 2010).
213
Id. at 119. See also Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004).
214
Id. at 121-43.
215
Id. at 160-74. Sam Bray has argued that the phrase “necessary and proper” “can be read as [an] instance[]
of an old but now largely forgotten figure of speech” known as hendiadys. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and
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Building on this work, Will Baude has argued that the Necessary
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to exercise “minor” or “incidental”
powers, but not “great” powers.216 In his view, “some powers are so great,
so important, or so substantive, that we should not assume that they were
granted by implication, even if they might help effectuate an enumerated
power.”217 Baude draws support for this approach from McCulloch itself,
which distinguished between great and incidental powers: “The power of
creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the
power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great
substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental
to other powers, or used as a means of executing them.”218
Although some of these theories have gained adherents on the
Supreme Court,219 skeptics like John Manning remain unconvinced. In his
view, judicial doctrines that restrict Congress’s choice of means improperly
transfer power from Congress to the judiciary. He believes that restrictive
approaches to the Necessary and Proper Clause necessarily employ
“discretionary standards that inevitably delegate lawmaking power to
someone.”220 In his view, the Constitution vests this lawmaking power in
“Congress rather than the judiciary.”221
Whatever meaning one ascribes to the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the fact that there are so many plausible interpretations confirms that the
Clause does not qualify as a clear and express surrender of any and all
sovereign rights Congress might seek to override as a means of
implementing its other powers. Under background principles of the law of
nations, the scope of an indefinite provision turned on whether its
application was considered to be “favorable” or “odious.” A favorable
application was one that furthered the common interest of both parties.
With respect to favorable applications, indefinite terms were to be
Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016). Hendiadys
involve “two terms separated by a conjunction [that] work together as a single complex expression.” Id. Bray
argues that understanding “necessary and proper” as this kind of expression makes sense of the historical debate
over the meaning of the phrase and suggests that the Clause “invoked a general principle of incidental powers,
drawing a line for congressional action that is on the leeway side of a strict word.” Id. at 692.
216
William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1749 (2013).
217
Id.
218
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411.
219
See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 879 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 402 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (stating that a law
is not “proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it “violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in
. . . various constitutional provisions”) (citing Lawson & Granger, supra note 210, at 297-326, 330-33).
220
Manning, supra note 205, at 60.
221
Id. John Harrison has also acknowledged the indeterminacy of distinguishing between great powers and
incidental powers. Although sympathetic to that distinction in principle, he conceded that “filling in the substance
is famously difficult.” John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1125 (2011).
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interpreted “to give [them] all the extent they are capable of in common
use.”222 By contrast, an odious application was one that benefitted one
party at the expense of another. In particular, the application of a legal
provision would be considered odious if it purported to change the status
quo by divesting a state of its pre-existing rights. If a provision divesting a
state of sovereign rights was clear, then the instrument would be given its
natural meaning even though its application was odious. On the other hand,
if a provision was vague or ambiguous as to whether it divested a sovereign
right, then, as Vattel explained, “we should . . . take the term in the most
confined sense . . ., without going directly contrary to the tenour of the
writing, and without doing violence to the terms.”223
These rules of interpretation suggest that the Necessary and Proper
Clause should not be read to divest the States of rights that they did not
clearly and expressly surrender. As discussed, the States compromised their
exclusive sovereign right to regulate their own citizens within their own
territory by giving Congress express powers to tax and regulate these
individuals. To be sure, these surrenders were “odious” in Vattel’s
taxonomy. But because they were clear and express, the Necessary and
Proper Clause empowered Congress to enact incidental legislation in
regulating individuals as far as the natural meaning of “necessary and
proper” allowed. Although the natural meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause is disputed,224 it clearly authorizes Congress to exercise some
incidental powers to carry into execution its Article I, Section 8 powers over
individuals. When Congress uses the Clause to regulate individuals in
furtherance of its enumerated powers, it is exercising a form of sovereign
power already clearly surrendered. On the other hand, when Congress
attempts to use the Clause to regulate States rather than individuals, it is
claiming a power to override the States’ distinct sovereign right against
being commandeered by another sovereign. Because the States never
clearly and expressly surrendered this right either in the Necessary and
Proper Clause or in any other provision of the original Constitution, the
Clause must be taken in this context “in the most confined sense.” This rule
222

1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 307, at 234 (emphasis omitted).
Id., bk. II, § 308, at 235.
224
In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Supreme Court held that the Necessary
and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact “all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted” to
carrying into execution its enumerated powers. Id. at 421. The Justices still dispute what “plainly adapted”
means. The Court has held in recent times that the Clause empowers Congress to enact means that are “rationally
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126,
134 (2010). Justice Thomas has argued, however, that “plainly adapted” means not a law have a mere “rational
relation” to an enumerated power, but instead that it have an “obvious, simple, and direct relation” to an
enumerated power. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito has
suggested that for a law to be “necessary and proper,” it must have “a substantial link to Congress’ enumerated
powers.” Comstock, 560 U.S. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring).
223
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of interpretation was designed to prevent the inadvertent surrender of
sovereign rights.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly invoke these
background principles of interpretation in McCulloch v. Maryland, they are
reflected in its analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In McCulloch,
the Court upheld Congress’s regulation of individuals to charter a bank,
rejecting restrictive interpretations of the Clause based on its use of the term
“necessary”:
If reference be had to its use in the common affairs of the
world or in approved authors, we find that it frequently
imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful,
or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an
end is generally understood as employing any means
calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to
those single means without which the end would be entirely
unattainable.225
The Court observed in its analysis that the people of the States, in adopting
the Constitution, authorized the federal government to exercise its powers
directly upon them:
But when, ‘in order to form a more perfect union,’ it was
deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective
government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to
the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them,
was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the
Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on
the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them, and for their benefit.226
Accordingly, to the extent that the States surrendered their exclusive right to
govern their own citizens by adopting the Constitution, the Court’s decision
to construe the Necessary and Proper Clause according to the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word “necessary” was fully consistent with the rules
governing surrender of sovereign rights prescribed by the law of nations.
Significantly, the McCulloch Court made clear in the course of its
decision that Congress could not achieve its ends by using the Necessary
225
226

Id. at 413-14.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-05.
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and Proper Clause to command the States to create or tailor the operations
of state-chartered banks. Opponents of the Bank of the United States
argued that it was not necessary for Congress to create the Bank because
Congress could rely on state banks to support the operations of the federal
government. Significantly, Chief Justice Marshall rejected this argument on
the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to control the
legislative powers of the States: “To impose on [the federal government]
the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another
Government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious,
the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other
Governments which might disappoint its most important designs, and is
incompatible with the language of the Constitution.”227 In other words,
foreshadowing Justice O’Connor’s analysis in New York v. United States,
Marshall reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the
power to charter a bank; it does not give Congress the power to require the
States to charter a bank.228
227

Id. at 424.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“The allocation of power contained in the
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”). This method of analysis
is consistent with other opinions of the Marshall Court. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
Marshall, after first observing that under the Articles of Confederation “were sovereign, were completely
independent, and were connected with each other only by a league,” contended that under the Constitution “the
whole character in which the States appear underwent a change.” Id. at 187. But his analysis did not convey that
the word “State” meant something different under the Constitution than it had meant under the Articles. Under
rules derived from the law of nations, a State could only change its character, i.e. surrender sovereign rights, in
clear and express terms. Accordingly, Marshall wrote that “the extent” of any change in the character of the
States “must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.” Id. The
rules that he proceeded to apply to determine the scope of federal power aligned with Vattel’s rules of
interpretation. Marshall wrote in Gibbons that the Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly
granted by the people to their government.” Id. (emphasis added). He explained that when the Constitution
expressly confers a power, the Court should not strictly construe it, but instead should understand the framers and
the people “to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.” Id. at 188.
Justice Story applied the same rules of interpretation in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816):
228

The government, then, of the United States can claim no powers which are not
granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are
expressly given, or given by necessary implication. On the other hand, this instrument, like
every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms,
and where a power is expressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular
cases unless that construction grow out of the context expressly or by necessary
implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense
unreasonably restricted or enlarged.
Id. at 326. Both Marshall and Story explained that express grants of power to the federal government should be
interpreted in light of their ordinary or natural meaning. But neither read the Constitution to divest the States of
sovereign rights absent an express surrender of the right in question. For example, as explained, in interpreting
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Marshall took as given that Congress could not force States to create state
banks. See supra notes 227-228, and accompanying text. Similarly, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539
(1842), Story found that the federal government lacked power to force state magistrates to enforce a federal law.
Id. at 621-22. If, as Marshall believed, the Articles of Confederation used the term “State” to refer to a free and
independent sovereign, then the Constitution could divest them of their sovereign rights, and thus change their
character, only by virtue of express terms or unavoidable implication.
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Nearly two centuries later, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected Congress’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause
to commandeer the States. In striking down Congress’s attempt to
commandeer state executive officers to enforce federal law, the Court
dismissed the argument that Congress could rely on the Necessary and
Proper Clause to support such action. According to the Court:
When a “La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution” the
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty
reflected in the various constitutional provisions we
mentioned earlier, it is not a “La[w] . . . proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause,” and is thus, in the
words of The Federalist, “merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation”
which “deserve[s] to be treated as such.”229
Dean Manning has criticized the Court’s reasoning in Printz on the
ground that it “authorized the Court to derive and enforce a zone of
inviolable state sovereignty from its own reading of the constitutional
structure as a whole.”230 As discussed in Part IV, however, the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine (including its restrictive interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause) should not be dismissed as mere judicial
activism. Rather, properly understood, the doctrine results from the
Constitution’s use of the term “States” read in light of background
principles of the law of nations. Manning’s reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause would give Congress virtually unlimited power to override
the sovereign rights of the States—not only by commandeering state
officers, but also (to take a real example) by dictating the locations of the
States’ capitals.231 This conclusion would be flatly inconsistent with the
historical meaning of the term “States” and the rules of interpretation
governing their surrender of sovereign rights. In short, because the “States”
did not expressly surrender these rights in the Constitution, they necessarily
retained them under well recognized principles of the law of nations.
Reading the Necessary and Proper Clause in light of background
principles of the law of nations suggests that the Marshall Court correctly
applied the Clause to uphold broad congressional discretion to regulate
individuals as a means of implementing Congress’s enumerated powers. At
the same time, read in light of the law of nations, the Clause cannot be taken
as an independent surrender of the States’ residual sovereignty not to be
commandeered by the federal government. As the next Part explains, in at
229

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
Manning, supra note 205, at 39.
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (invalidating Congress’s attempt to limit Oklahoma’s ability to
move its state capital as a condition of admission to the Union).
230
231
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least three contexts, the Supreme Court has rejected congressional efforts to
override the sovereign rights of the States in the absence of express
constitutional provisions surrendering such rights. Understanding the
Constitution—and American federalism—in light of the law of nations
places all three doctrines on a firmer foundation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In resolving important federalism questions, the Supreme Court has
relied less on the constitutional text and more on historical understandings
of the structure of government created by the Constitution. Textualists have
criticized the Court’s decisions restraining federal power and upholding
state sovereignty on the ground that the Constitution contains no specific
text justifying these decisions.
There are at least two problems with this critique. First, as we argue
in this Article, it overlooks the term “States” in the Constitution. At the
founding, “State” was a term of art drawn from the law of nations and
referred to a sovereign nation entitled to a well-recognized set of rights
under such law. To be sure, “States” could surrender or compromise their
sovereign rights, but only by doing so expressly in a binding legal
document. Second, the textualist critique has things backwards by insisting
that courts should only uphold the sovereign rights of the States if they can
point to a specific constitutional provision protecting those rights. At the
founding, a “State” was entitled to all of the rights recognized by the law of
nations minus those it expressly surrendered. Thus, the relevant question is
not whether the constitutional text expressly confers sovereign rights on the
States, but whether the constitutional text expressly takes them away.
This Part discusses three important Supreme Court doctrines that
comport with this understanding of state sovereignty at the founding—state
sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal
sovereignty of the States. Each of these doctrines upholds a traditional
sovereign right of the States against federal interference unauthorized by the
express terms of the Constitution.232
First, the Supreme Court has long held that the States enjoy
sovereign immunity under the Constitution from suits brought by
individuals without a State’s consent. Critics charge that this immunity
lacks an adequate basis in the text of the original Constitution, and that the
Eleventh Amendment provides only limited support for the Court’s
232
Reading the Constitution against the backdrop of the law of nations undoubtedly has implications for
other provisions of the Constitution as well. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 602 (2018) (arguing that the language of the Guarantee Clause should be viewed through the lens of
eighteenth century international law).
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recognition of state sovereign immunity. As discussed, this critique has
things backwards. The question is not whether the text of the Constitution
affirmatively grants the States sovereign immunity; rather the question is
whether the text expressly withdraws the sovereign immunity traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign “States” under the law of nations. Taking into
account the Eleventh Amendment’s authoritative gloss on Article III, the
original Constitution contains no express provisions purporting to override
the States’ sovereign immunity. Thus, the Court’s broad doctrine of state
sovereign immunity is not only consistent with, but affirmatively required
by, the constitutional text.
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may not
commandeer the States by requiring state legislatures to adopt state law or
state executive officials to enforce federal law. Again, critics charge that
this doctrine lacks an adequate basis in the Constitution because the
constitutional text contains no provisions affirmatively granting the States a
right to be free from commandeering by the federal government. And
again, the critics are posing the wrong question. The question is not
whether the text of the Constitution expressly gives the States a right not to
be commandeered; rather, the question is whether the Constitution
expressly divested the “States” of their pre-existing right to conduct their
governmental operations free from the control of another sovereign.
Because the Constitution contains no provision of this kind, the Court’s
anti-commandeering decisions are fully consistent with textualism.
Third, at the founding, independent “States” were entitled to
absolute equality under the law of nations. This background context
suggests that the Court has correctly recognized the equal sovereignty of the
States under the original Constitution. Because the original Constitution
contains no provisions expressly surrendering equal sovereignty, the States
necessarily retained it. To be sure, the Civil War Amendments altered the
constitutional equality of the States, but only to the extent expressly set
forth in the Amendments.
A.

State Sovereign Immunity

Although the Supreme Court initially rejected state sovereign
immunity in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia,233 the Court broadly
embraced the doctrine following the States’ ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment.234 The precise terms of the Amendment support some—but

233
234

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817

(2010).
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not all—of the Court’s decisions.235 For this reason, the Court has struggled
to provide a textual basis for its broader doctrine of state sovereign
immunity,236 relying instead on the expectations of the founders,237 the
“dignity” of the States,238 and the “fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design.”239 The Court’s failure to articulate a persuasive
rationale grounded in the text of either the original Constitution or the
Eleventh Amendment has left its broad doctrine of state sovereign
immunity open to charges of illegitimacy.240
Understanding state sovereign immunity as part of the original
public meaning of the term “States” in the Constitution resolves the
apparent conflict between textualism and federalism in this context. As
discussed in Part I, a “State” possessed a broad range of sovereign rights—
including sovereign immunity—under the law of nations. A state could
surrender its rights, but only if it did so clearly and expressly in a binding
legal instrument. Accordingly, the “States” mentioned in the Constitution
possessed sovereign immunity from suit except to the extent they expressly
surrendered it in the document. As the ratification debates show, the
Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III were the only provisions in
the original Constitution that even arguably constituted an express surrender
of the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by individuals. The founders—
and the early Supreme Court—debated sovereign immunity in precisely
these terms.
In considering the proposed Constitution, Anti-Federalists feared
that U.S. courts would read the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article
III as an express surrender of state sovereign immunity in the controversies
they described. Federalists responded that these provisions were ambiguous
at best, and thus could not be construed as an express surrender of the
States’ immunity from suit. Notwithstanding these assurances, the Supreme
235
Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hearing suits against States “by
Citizens of another State,” U.S. CONST. amend. XI, the Supreme Court has long held that the States enjoy
immunity from suits brought by their own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Court has also
held that States enjoy sovereign immunity in their own courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), even
though the Eleventh Amendment is written as a restriction on “[t]he Judicial power of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
236
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (stating that “we long have recognized that
blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of’”) (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934)).
237
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (““Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment
was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?”).
238
See Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their
status as sovereign entities.”).
239
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
240
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Young, supra note 28, at 1664–75.
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Court ruled in Chisholm v. Georgia that the plain language of the CitizenState diversity provisions authorized suits against States. In response,
Congress and the States quickly and overwhelmingly adopted the Eleventh
Amendment to counteract the Supreme Court’s ruling and reinstate their
preferred construction of Article III. By foreclosing further reliance on the
only provisions of the Constitution that even arguably divested the States’
of sovereign immunity from suit by individuals, the Eleventh Amendment
removed any argument that the States had surrendered their pre-existing
sovereign immunity in the Constitution. As explained below, this account
best explains both the initial controversy surrounding Article III and why
the Eleventh Amendment constituted a complete revocation of any
surrender of state sovereign immunity in the original Constitution.
1.

Immunity Under the Proposed Constitution

The Constitutional Convention did not discuss whether the
Constitution included a surrender of the States’ sovereign immunity from
suit by individuals, but the issue quickly arose as a potential roadblock to
ratification. Anti-Federalists objected that the Citizen-State diversity
provisions of Article III could be construed to authorize suits against States.
These provisions extended federal judicial power to controversies “between
a State and Citizens of another State” and “between a State . . . and foreign .
. . Citizens or Subjects.”241 Anti-Federalists feared that courts would
construe the word “between” to refer to suits by and against a State, and
thus treat those provisions as an express surrender of state sovereign
immunity.242
As discussed in Part I, the law of nations supplied background rules
to govern the interpretation of instruments purporting to surrender or divest
sovereign rights. Under these rules, a clear and express surrender was to be
interpreted according to its ordinary and natural meaning. On the other
hand, courts would interpret vague or ambiguous provisions to avoid an
“odious” reading, including one that would divest a state of its sovereign
rights under the law of nations. This background provides crucial context
for understanding the ratification debates over the effect of Article III on
state sovereign immunity. Anti-Federalists thought that courts would treat
the Citizen-State diversity provisions as a clear and express surrender of
state sovereign immunity, whereas Federalists insisted that these provisions
were at best ambiguous and therefore would have no such effect.
241

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 30, 41-42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1883) [hereinafter 14 DHRC].
242
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For example, Brutus objected that “it is humiliating and degrading to
a government” to subject “a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of
an individual.”243 Similarly, George Mason objected that the Citizen-State
diversity provisions were inconsistent with State sovereignty:
Is this State to be brought to the bar of justice like a
delinquent individual? — Is the sovereignty of the State to
be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender? — Will the
States undergo this mortification? — I think this power
perfectly unnecessary.244
Leading supporters of the Constitution, including Madison,
Hamilton, and Marshall, responded by assuring critics that the Citizen-State
diversity provisions would not be construed to authorize suits against States
because these provisions did not constitute a sufficiently clear and express
surrender of the States’ preexisting immunity. In his response, Madison
first acknowledged that “this part” of the Constitution “might be better
expressed.”245
He maintained, however, that “a fair and liberal
interpretation upon the words” would not authorize the federal government
“to commit the oppressions [Mason] dreads.”246 Instead, Madison insisted
that “[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any State into Court.”247
Accordingly, he stressed that “[t]he only operation [the provisions] can
have, is, that if a State should wish to bring suit against a citizen [of another
State or of a foreign State], it must be brought before the Federal Court.”248
Patrick Henry dismissed Madison’s construction of Article III as
“perfectly incomprehensible,” and argued that ‘[i]f Gentlemen pervert the
most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the
243
Brutus, Letter XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 795, 796 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2004) [hereinafter
20 DHRC].
244
George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1403, 1406 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter 10 DHRC].
245
James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at
1409, 1409.
246
Id.
247
James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at
1412, 1414.
248
Id. Similarly, John Marshall also argued that the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III should
be construed narrowly to avoid authorizing federal courts to hear suits against States. In his view, “[i]t is not
rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a Court.” John Marshall, Address to the
Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 1430, 1433. He contended that “this
construction is warranted by the words,” but also stressed that this partiality in favor of the States “cannot be
avoided” because “I see a difficulty in making a State a defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.” Id.
Anti-Federalists remained unconvinced by these assurances. Patrick Henry remarked that Madison’s construction
was “perfectly incomprehensible,” and objected that “[i]f Gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the
usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument.” Patrick Henry, Address to the
Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 1419, 1422.
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people, there is an end of all argument.”249 In response, John Marshall
insisted that the Citizen-State diversity provisions would not authorize “the
sovereign power” to “be dragged before a Court.” Rather, in his view,
“[t]he intent is, to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in
other States.”250
Alexander Hamilton explicitly invoked principles drawn from the
law of nations to allay the Anti-Federalists’ fears. In The Federalist No. 81,
he sought to refute “a supposition which has excited some alarm upon very
mistaken grounds.”251 Rejecting the Anti-Federalists’ claim that the
Citizen-State diversity provisions would permit suits against States, he
explained:
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public
securities of one State to the citizens of another, would
enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for
the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the
following considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
This is the general sense, and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely
ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an
alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering
the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A
recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us,
that there is no color to pretend that the State governments
would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free
from every constraint but that which flows from the
obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the
sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign
249

Patrick Henry, Address to the Virginia Convention, (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at
1419, 1422.
250
John Marshall, Address to the Virginia Convention, (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at
1430, 1433.
251
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 548 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
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will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against
States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be
enforced? It is evident, it could not be done without waging
war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the
federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a
pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which
would involve such a consequence, would be altogether
forced and unwarrantable.252
Hamilton’s discussion reflects several important principles drawn
from the law of nations about the nature of state sovereignty and the steps
necessary for a State to alienate its sovereignty. Hamilton observed that
“the government of every State in the Union” now enjoys “the attributes of
sovereignty,” including the right “not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.”253 Hamilton explained that “[t]his is the
general sense, and the general practice of mankind”—a clear reference to
the law of nations.254 Given the States’ preexisting sovereignty, he asserted
that immunity from suit by individuals “will remain with the States” unless
“there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.”255
This approach precisely tracks Vattel’s discussion of state sovereignty and
the means by which a state may surrender sovereign rights under the law of
nations.256
To support his conclusion that the States would not surrender their
right to sovereign immunity by adopting the Constitution, Hamilton
directed the reader to his earlier explanation of the “circumstances which
are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty.” In the relevant
portion of The Federalist No. 32, Hamilton explained that “the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had” minus only those rights expressly delegated to the United States
in the Constitution:
An intire consolidation of the States into one
complete national sovereignty would imply an entire
subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might
remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the
general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a
252

Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 548.
254
Id. at 549.
255
Id.
256
Hamilton’s discussion also undoubtedly reflected his experience at the Constitutional Convention, where
he strongly opposed any proposals to authorize Congress to regulate States and enforce such regulations by force.
See infra notes 358-361, and accompanying text. This explains his observation at the end of his discussion: “To
what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be
enforced? It is evident, it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State . . . .”
253
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partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated
to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this
alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited
the States from exercising the like authority; and where it
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT.257
Applying these principles in The Federalist No. 81 to determine the
effect of the Constitution on state sovereign immunity, Hamilton concluded
that “there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts
in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the
obligations of good faith.”258 In his view, reading Article III to destroy “a
pre-existing right” of the States “by mere implication . . . would be
altogether forced and unwarrantable.”259
Hamilton’s analysis relied on a central principle of the law of
nations. At the time, a sovereign state could abrogate its sovereign rights
only through an express surrender. Like Madison and Marshall, Hamilton
did not regard the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III (or any
other part of the proposed Constitution) as an adequate surrender of the
State’s pre-existing right to sovereign immunity. Thus, all three leading
Federalists argued that the States retained all sovereignty they did not
expressly surrender in the proposed Constitution, and that the proposed
Constitution did not contain a clear surrender of the States’ immunity from
suits brought by individuals.
Significantly, the Anti-Federalists did not disagree with Hamilton’s
framework for evaluating extent to which the States surrendered their
sovereignty under the Constitution. Like Hamilton, they started from the
assumption that the States retained all sovereignty not clearly and expressly
surrendered in the Constitution.
Unlike Hamilton, however, they
considered the Citizen-State diversity provisions (especially their use of the
term “between”) to be a clear and express surrender of state sovereign
immunity with respect to suits brought by the citizens specified by these
257

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 199-200 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton).
259
Id.
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provisions. The important point for present purposes is not whether one
side or the other had the better argument on the merits, but rather that all
sides in the debate assumed that the States could only surrender their preexisting sovereign rights by clearly and expressly surrendering them in the
Constitution. Based in part on the Federalists’ assurances that Article III
would be construed narrowly, the States ultimately ratified the Constitution
despite the Anti-Federalists’ concerns.
2.

Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment

Notwithstanding the Federalists’ assurances during ratification, a
majority of the Supreme Court ruled in Chisholm v. Georgia260 that the
States had in fact surrendered part of their sovereign immunity by adopting
the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III. Chisholm considered
whether a citizen of South Carolina could sue Georgia in federal court to
recover a debt. The Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III extend
the federal judicial power “to Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State.”261 The question before the Court was whether
this provision constituted an express surrender of the States’ sovereign
immunity from suit. Although each Justice issued a separate opinion, in
keeping with the Court’s practice at the time, all five Justices analyzed the
question in accordance with the rules of interpretation set forth in Vattel’s
treatise. Four Justices concluded that the text of the Citizen-State diversity
provisions qualified as an express surrender. Justice Iredell, the lone
dissenter, applied the same interpretive principles, but concluded that these
provisions did not constitute an adequate surrender of state sovereign
immunity.
Justice Blair characterized the constitutional question as whether the
States surrendered their right of sovereign immunity when they adopted the
Constitution. “[I]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than
the sovereign’s own Courts,” Justice Blair wrote, “it follows that when a
State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her
right of sovereignty.”262 Justice Blair stressed that the States gave up this
right expressly in Article III:
What then do we find there requiring the submission of
individual states to the judicial authority of the United
States? This is expressly extended, among other things, to
260

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
262
Id. at 452 (Opinion of Blair, J.)
261
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controversies between a State and citizens of another State.
Is then the case before us one of that description?
Undoubtedly it is.263
Justice Blair saw no basis to distinguish between cases in which a state
was the plaintiff as opposed to the defendant. “Both cases,” he
concluded, “were intended.”264 Accordingly, he determined that the Court
could hear a suit by a citizen of South Carolina against Georgia because
“clear and positive directions . . . of the Constitution” authorized it to do
so.265
Even Justice Wilson, who wrote the most nationalist opinion,
applied the same rules of interpretation. Justice Wilson did not believe that
the law of nations was directly applicable because the States and the federal
government comprised one nation, formed by sovereign act of the people.266
Thus, in his view, the question was: “could the people of those [American]
States, among whom were those of Georgia, bind those States, and Georgia
among the others, by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial power so
vested?”267 This question, he thought, “must unavoidably receive an
affirmative answer.”268 He thus proceeded to consider whether the people
divested the States of sovereign immunity by adopting the Constitution.269
Undertaking essentially the same inquiry as Blair, Wilson wrote that
“[t]hese questions may be resolved, either by fair and conclusive
deductions, or by direct and explicit declarations.”270 Like Blair, Wilson
concluded that the express words of the Constitution divested the States of
their right to sovereign immunity in this case:
But, in my opinion, this [conclusion] rests not upon the
legitimate result of fair and conclusive deduction from the
Constitution: it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, but the direct
and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself. . . . ‘The
judicial power of the United States shall extend to
controversies, between a State and citizens of another State.’
Could the strictest legal language; could even that language,
which is peculiarly appropriated to an art, deemed, by a great
263

Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
Id.
265
Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
266
Id. at 453 (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (“From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be
expected. By that law the several States and Governments spread over the globe, are considered as forming a
society, not a NATION.”).
267
Id. at 463.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 464 (“The next question . . . is, Has the Constitution done so? Did those people mean to exercise
this their undoubted power?”).
270
Id. (emphasis added).
264
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master, to be one of the most honorable, laudable, and
profitable things in our law; could this strict and appropriated
language, describe, with more precise accuracy, the cause
now depending before the tribunal?271
Justice Cushing likewise concluded that the Constitution expressly
divested the States of sovereign immunity. Justice Cushing explained that
“[w]hatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own
necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of
States.”272 He found that the people had given the federal courts power to
hear cases against States, notwithstanding the States’ pre-existing sovereign
immunity, because “[t]he judicial power . . . is expressly extended to
‘controversies between a State and citizens of another State.’”273 He
concluded that “[t]he case, then, seems clearly to fall within the letter of the
Constitution.”274
Finally, after observing that the Constitution transferred “many
prerogatives . . . to the national government,”275 Chief Justice Jay proceeded
“to enquire whether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national
compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens of another State.”276
For Jay, “[t]his enquiry naturally leads our attention, 1st. To the design of
the Constitution. 2nd. To the letter and express declaration in it.”277 Jay
explained that “the Constitution (to which Georgia is a party)
authorises . . . an action against her” by a citizen of another State278
because Article III extends the judicial power to “controversies between a
State and citizens of another State.”279 Jay applied the “ordinary rules for
construction” and rejected the suggestion “that this [provision] ought to
be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting those in
which a State may be Plaintiff.”280 In Jay’s view, “[i]f we attend to the
words, we find them to be express, positive, and free from ambiguity.”281
Only Justice Iredell dissented in Chisholm. Although he was
prepared to decide the case on the ground that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
not authorized the Supreme Court to hear it, he proceeded—like his
colleagues—to address whether “upon a fair construction of the
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Constitution of the United States, the power contended for really exists.”282
Justice Iredell explained that the States possessed all sovereign powers not
delegated to the United States:
Every State in the Union in every instance where its
sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I
consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States
are in respect to the powers surrendered. The United States
are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all
the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the
United States have no claim to any authority but such as the
States have surrendered to them: Of course the part not
surrendered must remain as it did before.283
Although Justice Iredell did not believe that the law of nations
applied directly to the case,284 he described the law of nations as “furnishing
rules of interpretation” applicable to the question presented.285 Applying
those rules, he explained that his “present opinion is strong against any
construction of [the Constitution], which will admit, under any
circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of
money.”286 Echoing Hamilton’s and Madison’s arguments during the
ratification debates, Justice Iredell thought that “every word in the
Constitution may have its full effect without involving this consequence,
and that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication
(neither of which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorise the
deduction of so high a power.”287
Significantly, although the Justices disagreed over whether Article
III clearly authorized suits against States by citizens of other States, they all
approached the constitutional question the same way—namely, by asking
whether the States had expressly surrendered their sovereign immunity from
such suits in the Constitution. This approach was drawn directly from the
law of nations. All five Justices started with the assumption that the States
retained all of their pre-existing sovereign rights—including sovereign
immunity—unless they clearly surrendered them in the constitutional text.
Their disagreement was over whether the Citizen-State diversity provisions
constituted an adequate surrender. The Chisholm majority ascribed the
282
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ordinary meaning to the term “between” in the Citizen-State diversity
provisions (rather than reading it to mean “by” but not “against”). On this
understanding, the majority concluded that the States had clearly and
expressly surrendered their sovereign immunity in these provisions. Justice
Iredell disagreed and endorsed the narrow construction of the text favored
by Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton during the ratification debates.
Although Justice Iredell’s construction coincided with the assurances given
during the ratification debates, it was at least in tension with the ordinary
meaning of the term “between.”
Regardless of the merits of the Chisholm decision, efforts began
immediately to override it.
Within days, Representative Theodore
Sedgwick and Senator Caleb Strong (both of Massachusetts) introduced
constitutional amendments in the House and the Senate to restore the States’
sovereign immunity. Massachusetts was keenly interested in the issue
because it faced a pending suit by a British subject for confiscating his
property in violation of the Treaty of Peace.288 During Congress’s
scheduled recess, Massachusetts took the lead in urging other States to
demand that Congress amend the Constitution to overturn Chisholm. On
September 27, 1793, the Massachusetts General Court resolved broadly
that the “power claimed . . . of compelling a State to be made defendant
. . . at the suit of an individual . . . is . . . unnecessary and inexpedient, and
in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the
several States.”289 The General Court further resolved:
That the Senators from this State in the Congress of the
United States be, and they hereby are instructed, and the
Representatives requested to adopt the most speedy and
effectual measures in their power, to obtain such
amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will
remove any clause or article of the said Constitution which
can be construed to imply or justify a decision that a State
is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or
individuals in any Court of the United States.290

288
See Vassall v. Massachusetts, discussed in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 352-61 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994).
289
RESOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 T HE
D OCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME C OURT OF THE U NITED S TATES , 1789-1800, at 440 (Maeva
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RESOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 289, at 440.
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The General Court directed the Governor to send this resolution to all
other States.291 As a consequence, four States quickly adopted very
similar resolutions,292 and three additional States were in the process of
doing so when Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment on March 4,
1794.293 Although these state resolutions differed slightly, all urged the
adoption of an amendment to remove or explain any provision of the
Constitution that could be construed to authorize any suit by an individual
against a State in federal court.294
At the start of the next session of Congress, Senator Strong
introduced a slightly revised version of his original proposal to accomplish
the States’ request.295 This version added language to make clear that it was
an “explanatory” amendment designed to correct the Supreme Court’s
erroneous construction of the Constitution retroactively.296 As written (and
ultimately adopted), the amendment provided: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”297 This
Amendment reinstated the Federalists’ preferred construction of the
Constitution by forbidding courts from construing Article III to authorize
291
See Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note
289, at 442, 442. On Oct. 8, 1793, Governor Hancock died and Samuel Adams assumed his duties. Id. at 443–
44.
292
See 5 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1792–1797 reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 289, at 609; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT.
1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 338–39; Resolution of North Carolina General
Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 615, 615; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE: DEC. 1793, at 111 (1794),
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 618, 618.
293
See JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at
610–11; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND: NOV.
1793, at 115–16 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 611; Proceedings of the Georgia House of
Representatives, Nov. 19, 1793, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289,
at 236. In addition, Pennsylvania and Delaware appointed special committees, but took no action before
Congress acted. See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 61–62 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 612–13;
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE: JAN. 1794, at 9 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 289, at 614, 615.
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See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT.
1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 338 (calling on Virginia’s Senators and
Representatives “to obtain such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will remove or explain
any clause or article of the said constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is
compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any court of the United States”).
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Representative Sedgwick’s proposal was abandoned presumably because it went well beyond the terms of
the States’ resolutions by proposing to bar all suits against States not only by individuals, but also by “any body
politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.” Proceedings of the United States House of
Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 289, at 605–06. Antifederalists generally accepted the need for jurisdiction over suits between States, and
perhaps even suits between States and foreign States. See Clark, supra note 234, at 1891 n.441.
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any suits against States by individuals. The Supreme Court subsequently
interpreted the Amendment to apply retroactively to require dismissal of all
pending suits against States.298
3.

Immunity After the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment has been something of a mystery to
modern readers. Depending on one’s view of sovereign immunity, the
Amendment seems to be arbitrarily too narrow or too broad.299 For this
reason, both on and off the Court, “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is
universally taken not to mean what it says.”300 The Supreme Court has
generally understood the Amendment to mean more than it says, and has
upheld broad sovereign immunity beyond the precise terms of the
Amendment. On the other hand, many academics read the Amendment to
recognize less immunity than the text provides. Not surprisingly, textualists
have criticized both approaches and urged the Court to enforce “the
Eleventh Amendment as written.”301
Reading the Eleventh Amendment against background principles of
the law of nations makes sense of the text in historical context. In
accordance with the law of nations, the founders understood the “States” to
retain all of their traditional sovereign rights—including sovereign
immunity—unless they clearly and expressly surrendered them in the
Constitution.302 The Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III were
the only provisions of the original Constitution that even arguably
surrendered the States’ immunity from suits by individuals. As discussed,
the founders were sharply divided over whether these provisions constituted
a clear and express surrender of state sovereign immunity. After
ratification, the Chisholm Court found them to qualify as such a surrender.
The Eleventh Amendment was drafted as an explanatory amendment to
correct this reading. By specifying that the judicial power of the United
States “shall not be construed” to permit suits against States by the parties
specified in the Citizen-State diversity provisions, the Amendment
eliminated the only text in the original Constitution that could have been
298
See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). Because the Eleventh Amendment only
addresses suits by individuals against States, it does not by its terms affect suits between States or suits against
States by the United States or foreign States. Thus, whether States are subject to such suits turns on whether the
States clearly authorized them in the text of the original Constitution.
299
See Clark, supra note 234, at 1825-32.
300
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977).
301
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 1153 YALE
L.J. 1663, 1720 (2004); see Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989).
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construed as an express surrender of state sovereign immunity from such
suits. On this understanding, the pre-existing sovereign immunity of the
States was not limited—but merely restored—by the Eleventh Amendment.
The modern controversy regarding the scope of state sovereign
immunity began with Hans v. Louisiana,303 a decision that recognized broad
immunity beyond the cases covered by the Eleventh Amendment. Hans
was a suit brought by a citizen of Louisiana against Louisiana alleging that
the State’s repudiation of its bonds violated the Contracts Clause. The
plaintiff argued that he was “not embarrassed by the obstacle of the
Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits
against a State which are brought by the citizens of another State.”304 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that “the amendment does so read,”305 but
treated the Amendment as merely indicative of a broader unwritten
principle. According to the Court, the Amendment “shows that, on this
question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest authority
of this country was in accord rather with the minority than with the
majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v.
Georgia.”306 Invoking the remarks by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall
during the ratification debates, the Court concluded that “the cognizance of
suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of
the United States.”307 In the Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment
confirmed that the States retained their pre-existing immunity from
suit by individuals (regardless of citizenship). The Court regarded
as “almost an absurdity on its face”308 the suggestion that those who
drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amendment would have authorized
suits against States by their own citizens.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and even
extended Hans. For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,309
the Court reaffirmed the States’ sovereign immunity from suits in federal
court by their own citizens, and also held that Congress cannot abrogate
such immunity pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 powers. In Alden v.
Maine,310 the Court held that Congress also cannot use these powers to
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity in state court. In the Court’s view,
a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit only suits by
303
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citizens of other States in federal court would be unacceptably underinclusive and inconsistent with the expectations of those who ratified both
the original Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court thus
embraced a broad theory of state sovereign immunity under which States
enjoy immunity regardless of the citizenship of the individual plaintiff and
regardless of whether the suit is brought in federal or state court.
Academic critics have been quick to charge that the Supreme
Court’s decisions lack any discernable basis in the constitutional text. In
place of the Court’s broad approach, many would adopt the so-called
diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment.311 This theory would permit
individuals to sue States using any provision of Article III other than the
Citizen-State diversity provisions even if the suit falls within the literal
prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. On this reading, the Amendment
simply prevents federal courts from hearing suits against States when the
only available basis for jurisdiction is Citizen-State diversity. The
diversity theory itself contradicts the constitutional text, however, because
the Eleventh Amendment withdraws federal judicial power to hear “any
suit” commenced or prosecuted by a prohibited plaintiff.312
Like proponents of broad sovereign immunity, diversity theorists
depart from the text of the Eleventh Amendment to avoid what they
perceive to be its anomalous distinction between in- and out-of-state
citizens. Applying the Amendment “literally” to bar “any suit” with the
prohibited party alignment, they contend, would lead to the “unlikely
result” that “[a]ll suits brought against a state by an out-of-state citizen are
prohibited regardless of the existence of a federal question, but at the same
time any suit brought against a state by a citizen of that state is permitted,
provided a federal question exists.”313 In their view, the founders could
not have intended this distinction, so courts should narrow the scope of
the Amendment to avoid this result.
One need not choose between these two flawed readings of the
Eleventh Amendment. Instead, it is possible to reconcile state sovereign
immunity with the constitutional text by using background principles drawn
from the law of nations. As Hamilton and other founders recognized, the
“States” adopted the Constitution as equal and independent sovereign
311
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
312
See Marshall, supra note 301, at 1347 (observing that “the diversity theory goes on completely to ignore
the operative words of the amendment”); but see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J.
1425, 1481 (1987) (arguing that the diversity theory “makes perfect sense of all the words of the Amendment
itself”).
313
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States, with all of the rights that accompanied that status. Under the law of
nations, the States could alienate their sovereign rights only by clearly and
expressly surrendering them in the Constitution. These principles help to
explain not only why state sovereign immunity was a close question under
Article III, but also why the founders understood the Eleventh Amendment
to restore to the States full sovereign immunity.
No one during the drafting or ratification process ever suggested that
any provision of the Constitution other than the Citizen-State diversity
provisions could be construed to permit individuals to sue States.314
Modern observers anachronistically maintain that other provisions of
Article III—including those conferring federal question and admiralty
jurisdiction—authorized individuals to sue States. But, unlike the CitizenState diversity provisions, these provisions make no mention—clear or
ambiguous—of suits against States. For this reason, the founders—
operating against the backdrop of the law of nations—would not have
understood any of these provisions to constitute a plausible surrender of the
States’ preexisting right to sovereign immunity.315 Rather, the founders
identified the Citizen-State diversity clauses as the only provisions of
Article III that could have authorized individuals to sue States under the
prevailing rules governing the surrender of sovereign rights.
In light of this background, the Eleventh Amendment was perfectly
tailored to satisfy Massachusetts’ demand (echoed by other States) that the
Constitution be amended to “remove any clause or article of the said
Constitution which can be construed to imply or justify a decision that a
State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals
in any Court of the United States.”316 By clarifying that the Citizen-State
diversity provisions of Article III did not permit suits against States, the
Eleventh Amendment neutralized the only provisions of the Constitution
that could have been construed as an express surrender of the States’
immunity from suit by individuals. After the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, the States’ right to sovereign immunity—like all of their
sovereign rights—depended not on whether the Constitution expressly
granted the right, but on whether the States expressly surrendered it.
From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s broad conception of
state sovereign immunity is consistent with the original public meaning of
314

See Clark, supra note 234, at 1870-73.
Indeed, two acknowledged misstatements made during the ratification debates confirm that the CitizenState diversity provisions were the only portions of Article III that anyone thought could authorize individuals to
sue States without their consent. Two participants, one a Federalist and one an Anti-Federalist, mistakenly
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the constitutional text.317 Under background principles drawn from the law
of nations, the States retained their sovereign rights—including sovereign
immunity—unless they clearly and expressly surrendered them in the
Constitution. Although the States arguably surrendered their right to
sovereign immunity by adopting the Citizen-State diversity provisions in
Article III, the Eleventh Amendment instructs that Article III “shall not be
construed” to contain any such surrender .318
These principles support the Court’s distinction between
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I,
Section 8 and abrogation pursuant to the Civil War Amendments. With one
exception, the Court has rejected congressional power to abrogate under
Article I, Section 8 because its provisions do no expressly authorize
Congress to override the States’ sovereign immunity.319 By contrast, the
Court generally upholds abrogation under the enforcement powers of the
Civil War Amendments because they were designed to regulate the States
and expressly authorize Congress to enforce such regulations by appropriate
legislation.320
4.

Immunity in Other States’ Courts

Understanding state sovereign immunity through the lens of the law
of nations also sheds light on a related issue—the immunity of States in the
courts of other States. Under the law of nations, free and independent
States enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of other
sovereigns. Thus, unless the American States clearly surrendered this
aspect of sovereign immunity in the Constitution, they retained it. The only
provisions of the Constitution that arguably authorize suits against States in
the courts of another sovereign are found in Article III, Section 2, and none
of them authorizes suits in state courts. Article III permits federal courts to
317
Will Baude has reached a similar conclusion, albeit on somewhat different grounds. See William Baude,
Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017). Building on Steve Sach’s theory of
“constitutional backdrops,” Baude argues that sovereign immunity is a common law backdrop that “can’t be
changed [by Congress] because of the properly limited nature of Articles I and III.” Id. at 8. In his view, this
approach “makes sense of both the text and the Court’s sovereign immunity cases.” Id. at 9.
318
The fact that the original Constitution, as amended by the Eleventh Amendment, did not authorize
individuals to sue States did not leave individuals with no redress for a State’s misconduct. As Henry Monaghan
has explained, “[i]n suits for prospective relief, states are still accountable in federal court—through their
officers—for the violation of federal law.” Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110
HARV. L. REV. 102, 103 (1996); see also Clark, supra note 234, at 1903-07.
319
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating abrogation of state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause). But see Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S.
356 (2006) (upholding congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause).
320
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding abrogation of state sovereign immunity under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). For an argument that the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments against States is analogous to the scope of its power to regulate individuals under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, see Bradford Russell Clark, Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section 5
Power: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969, 1983-90 (1984).
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hear “Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and
Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.” In addition, as just discussed, the
Citizen-State diversity provisions arguably authorized federal courts to hear
suits against States by citizens of another State (or of a foreign State), but
jurisdiction under these provisions was withdrawn by the Eleventh
Amendment. Finally, Article III expressly grants the Supreme Court power
to hear controversies between two or more States. This grant undoubtedly
constitutes a specific surrender of sovereign immunity but was
uncontroversial and widely seen as a necessity at the founding.321
Notably, the Constitution contains no provisions purporting to
surrender the immunity of States in the courts of another State.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied this immunity in Nevada v. Hall,322
a case brought by California residents against Nevada in California state
court. The Court based its decision to deny Nevada’s claim of sovereign
immunity in large part on the lack of any constitutional text affirmatively
granting States such immunity.323 As explained in this Article, however,
this approach has things backwards. A constitutional provision granting the
States immunity in the courts of another State would have been superfluous
because, under the law of nations, the “States” already possessed sovereign
immunity from suit in the courts of another State. Thus, the relevant
question in Hall was whether the States affirmatively surrendered this
immunity in the Constitution. Because the Constitution contains no such
surrender, the States necessarily retained sovereign immunity in cases of
this kind.
The Supreme Court overruled Hall in Franchise Tax Board of
California v. Hyatt,324 a suit brought by a Nevada resident against a
California State agency in Nevada state court. The Nevada Supreme Court
rejected the agency’s claim of immunity, but the Supreme Court upheld it.
The Court’s rationale closely tracks the approach offered by this Article and
has implications far beyond the question of state immunity in sister-state
courts. The Court began by observing that “[a]fter independence, the States
considered themselves fully independent nations” pursuant to the
321
Article III also grants federal courts power to hear controversies “between” a State and foreign States, but
the Supreme Court has declined read this grant as a surrender of the States’ sovereign immunity from suit. See
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (finding Mississippi immune from suit by a foreign
State).
322
440 U.S. 410 (1979).
323
See id. at 426 (“Nothing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frustrate
[California’s] policy [of exercising jurisdiction] out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of Nevada.”). As Ann
Woolhandler pointed out, Hall was something of an outlier because its analysis differed from the Court’s general
approach to state sovereign immunity. See Ann Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
249, 250-51.
324
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Declaration of Independence.325 The Court then quoted Vattel for the
proposition that “‘[i]t does not . . . belong to any foreign power to take
cognisance of the administration of [another] sovereign, to set himself up
for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it.’”326 Accordingly,
the Court explained, “[t]he sovereign is “‘exemp[t] . . . from all [foreign]
jurisdiction.’”327
After surveying the founding history, the Hyatt Court concluded that
“Federalists and Antifederalists alike agreed in their preratification debates
that States could not be sued in the courts of other States”328 and enjoyed
immunity “under both the common law and the law of nations.”329 The
Court reasoned that the States retained this immunity unless they
affirmatively surrendered it: “The Constitution’s use of the term ‘States’
reflects both of these kinds of traditional immunity. And the States retained
these aspects of sovereignty, ‘except as altered by the plan of the
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.’”330
The Court
acknowledged that Article III contains several provisions that altered the
States’ immunity from suit in federal court, but stressed that the
Constitution contains no provisions that altered the States’ pre-existing
immunity from suit in the courts of another State. Accordingly, the Court
held that the States did not surrender this immunity by adopting the
Constitution.
The Hyatt Court also addressed and rejected the argument that the
States retained a distinct sovereign right to reject sister States’ claims of
immunity from suit in their courts. Hyatt argued that “before the
Constitution was ratified, the States had the power of fully independent
nations to deny immunity to fellow sovereigns; thus, the States must retain
that power today with respect to each other because ‘nothing in the
Constitution or formation of the Union altered that balance among the stillsovereign states.’”331 The Court rejected this argument because, in the
Court’s view, “the Constitution affirmatively altered the relationships
between the States, so that they no longer relate to each other solely as
foreign sovereigns.”332 Traditionally, disputes of this kind between
325
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limits one State’s authority to abrogate the immunity of another State in its courts. See Baude, supra note 317, at
24 (concluding States have no immunity from suit in another State’s courts because “[t]he Constitution doesn’t
limit states to enumerated powers and imposes relatively few constraints on their treatment of one another”).
Notably, Professor Baude’s argument agrees with the premise of this Article—namely, that the States retained all
sovereign authority they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution.
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sovereigns were not settled in the courts of either party, but through
negotiation or, if necessary, armed conflict. Because the Constitution
deprived the States of these tools, the Hyatt Court concluded that the States
surrendered any power they had to override the immunity of sister States in
their courts.333
For our purposes, the framework adopted by the Hyatt Court is more
important than its specific application. The Court started with the
proposition that, in adopting the Constitution, the States retained their preexisting sovereignty except to the extent they affirmatively surrendered it.
The Court found no indication in the Constitution that the States
surrendered their pre-existing immunity from suit in the courts of sister
States. At the same time, the Court identified several constitutional
provisions that—in the Court’s view—deprived the States of any power to
override another State’s immunity in their courts.334 The important point
for present purposes is that the Court sought to ascertain the sovereign
rights of the States by examining the extent to which they affirmatively
surrendered them in the Constitution.
B.

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

The original public meaning of the term “States”—and the rules
governing their surrender of sovereign rights—also support the Supreme
Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine. The doctrine prohibits Congress
from requiring States to use their legislative and executive powers to
implement federal regulatory programs. Although commentators have
disparaged the doctrine as an example of “freestanding federalism,”335 this
characterization overlooks the significance of the term “States” in the
Constitution and associated rules drawn from the law of nations. At the
founding, a sovereign state enjoyed complete independence from other
states, and no state could command another state to exercise its legislative
or executive powers. Such “commandeering” by an outside state would
have contradicted the other state’s independence. Under the law of nations,
a state could relinquish this aspect of sovereignty only by an express
surrender. Accordingly, the true original basis for the anti-commandeering
doctrine is that the American “States” retained all of their pre-existing
sovereign rights that they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution.

333
Id. at 1498 (“Some subjects that were decided by pure ‘political power’ before ratification now turn on
federal ‘rules of law.’”).
334
See id.
335
See Manning, supra note 205, at 34.
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1.

Commandeering Under the Articles of Confederation

To understand why the States authorized Congress to commandeer
them in the Articles of Confederation but withheld this power from
Congress in the Constitution, one must first appreciate the difficulties
associated with commandeering during the Confederation era. Under the
Articles, the States expressly authorized Congress to command them to
provide money, supplies, and personnel for the armed forces.336
Specifically, Article IX gave “the united states in congress assembled”
authority “to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the
service of the united states,” and “to make requisitions from each state for
its quota” of land forces.337 Article XIII made such requisitions binding
on the States by providing that “Every state shall abide by the
determinations of the united states in congress assembled, on all questions
which by this confederation are submitted to them.”338 Although the
Articles obligated the States to comply with Congress’s commands, the
States often disobeyed them with impunity.339 The Articles gave Congress
no means of enforcing its commands against States, and thus the United
States had no reliable means of raising revenue or supplying the armed
forces.
Congress tasked several Committees with crafting amendments to
make the Articles of Confederation more effective. James Madison served
on these Committees and favored authorizing Congress to use military force
to coerce compliance with its commands. A 1781 report written largely by
Madison initially suggested that Congress might have implied power to
coerce States under the Articles,340 but rejected this conclusion on the
ground that it is “most consonant to the spirit of a free constitution that on
the one hand all exercise of power should be explicitly and precisely
warranted, and on the other that the penal consequences of a violation of
336
Article VIII provided that federal expenses “shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be
supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each state.” ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. VIII. Article VIII also specified that the “taxes for paying that proportion shall be
laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time agreed upon
by the united states in congress assembled.” Id.
337
Id. art. IX.
338
Id. art. XIII.
339
As George Washington explained in 1780: “One State will comply with a requisition of Congress;
another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much
in point of time, that we are always working up hill, and ever shall be. . . .” Letter from George Washington to
Fielding Lewis (July 6, 1780), in WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 154, 157 n.1 (Lawrence B. Evans ed.,
1908) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Joseph Jones, in Congress (May 31, 1780)).
340
Amendment to Give Congress Coercive Power Over the States and Their Citizens (Mar. 16, 1781),
reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 114, at 141, 142 (stating that Article XIII of the Articles vests “a general and
implied power . . . in the United States in Congress assembled to enforce and carry into effect all the Articles of
the said Confederation against any of the States which shall refuse or neglect to abide by such their
determinations, or shall otherwise violate any of the said Articles, but no determinate and particular provision is
made for that purpose”).
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duty should be clearly promulgated and understood.”341 This language
applied the well-established rule of interpretation that indefinite legal
provisions should not be given odious readings, which included readings
that would impose penal consequences. Because the Articles did not
expressly give Congress express power to use military force against the
States to coerce compliance with federal commands, the report urged
amending the Articles to give Congress that power expressly.342
Congress never acted on Madison’s proposal perhaps because of
concerns identified by Alexander Hamilton. In 1782, Hamilton warned
that giving Congress coercive power over the States could trigger a civil
war (just as he later warned that abrogating state sovereign immunity could
do the same):
A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never
be a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and
intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect it: A
contest of arms will seldom be between the common
sovereign and a single refractory member; but between
distinct combinations of the several parts against each
other.343
Leading up to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison
continued to favor coercive force against States and to lament the
ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation. For example, before the
Convention, Madison wrote to George Washington to share the “outlines
of a new system.”344 In addition to proposing various new federal
powers, Madison stated that “the right of coercion should be expressly
declared” and could be exerted “either by sea or land.”345 He also
acknowledged, however, the potential dangers of giving Congress
coercive power over States. Specifically, he observed that “the difficulty
& awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State,
render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be precluded”
by other means ensuring the effective enforcement of federal law.346

341

Id.
See id. at 142-43; JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 25 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that Madison’s proposal would have amended the Articles of
Confederation to “give the Union the power literally to coerce delinquent states into doing their duty, either by
marching the Continental army within their borders or by stationing armed ships outside their harbors”).
343
Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. VI (July 4, 1782), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1779-1781, at 105 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
344
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 MADISON WRITINGS, supra
note 111, at 344, 344.
345
Id. at 348.
346
Id.
342
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2.

Rejecting Commandeering Under the Constitution

At the outset of the Constitutional Convention, Edmond Randolph
introduced the Virginia Plan (prepared with Madison’s input). The Plan
proposed that that “the National Legislature ought to be impowered to
enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation &
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.”347 Madison thought
that continuing Congress’s power to commandeer the States would
necessitate giving the National Legislature a new express power to
coerce compliance. Accordingly, as initially introduced, the Virginia
Plan included a provision empowering the National Legislature “to call
forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to
fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.”348
The delegates strongly objected to this aspect of the Virginia Plan
and it was quickly set aside in favor of crafting a less dangerous alternative.
George Mason admitted that the present Confederation was “deficient in
not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but he
argued very cogently that punishment could not <in the nature of things be
executed on> the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt. was
necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those
only whose guilt required it.”349
Moved by these objections, Madison acknowledged that giving
Congress power to coerce States could lead to the destruction of the
Union and expressed the hope that the Convention could devise a
plan that avoided this feature:
Mr. M<adison>, observed that the more he reflected on the
use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the
justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people
collectively and not individually. — , A Union of States
<containing such an ingredient> seemed to provide for its
own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look
more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of
347
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 17, 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
348
Id. The Pinckney Plan also endorsed coercive power over the States. See Charles Pinckney,
Observations on the Plan of Government submitted to the Federal Convention, in Philadelphia (May 28, 1787),
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 108, at 106, 119. Pinckney observed that “the present Confederation”
lacked such power, id., and warned that “[u]nless this power of coercion is infused, and exercised when
necessary, the States will most assuredly neglect their duties.” Id.
349
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 33, 34 (brackets in original).
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punishment, and would probably be considered by the party
attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which
it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be
framed as might render this recourse unnecessary, and
moved that the clause be postponed.350
The solution ultimately embraced by the Convention was to
withhold power from Congress to command States and instead empower it
to regulate individuals directly. This fundamental shift eliminated any need
to empower Congress to enforce its commands against States because
Congress would be given no power to command them. Rather, under this
alternative approach, the federal government would enforce its commands
through ordinary law enforcement against individuals.
As George Mason explained at the Convention: “Under the
existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States not the people of the
States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals. The case
will be changed in the new plan of Govt.”351 Following these early
discussions, a consensus emerged that the “national government had to
be reconstituted with power to enact, execute, and adjudicate its own laws,
acting directly on the American people, without having to rely on the
cooperation of the states.”352 Madison himself went from favoring
congressional power to command and coerce the States to strongly
opposing this approach: “Any Govt. for the U. States formed on the
supposed practicability of using force agst. the <unconstitutional
proceedings> of the States, wd. prove as visionary & fallacious as the
Govt. of Congs. [under the Articles of Confederation].”353
The ensuing debate over the New Jersey Plan illustrates the stark
choice the Convention faced: either revise and expand the Articles of
Confederation (by authorizing Congress to command and coerce States)
or abandon the Articles entirely in favor of a new system (under which
Congress would command and coerce individuals rather than States).
Dissatisfied with the Virginia Plan, William Paterson offered the New
Jersey Plan as complete substitute.354 Paterson’s Plan would have merely
“revised, corrected & enlarged” the Articles of Confederation rather than

350
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
351
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1
supra note 108, at 132, 133.
352
RAKOVE, supra note 144, at 53.
353
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1
supra note 108, at 164, 165 (footnote omitted).
354
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1
supra note 108, at 242, 242–245.

FARRAND’S RECORDS,
FARRAND’S RECORDS,
FARRAND’S RECORDS,
FARRAND’S RECORDS,
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replace them with an entirely new system.355 The Plan would have
retained and expanded Congress’s power to command States, and
would have augmented it by expressly authorizing the federal
government to coerce the States’ compliance through military force.356
The delegates strongly objected to the New Jersey’s Plan’s
reliance on coercion against States. Edmund Randolph pronounced
coercion “to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals.”357
Alexander Hamilton conceded that the Virginia Plan “departs itself from
the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on
individuals.”358 Nonetheless, he agreed with Randolph “that we owed it to
our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential
to its happiness.”359 Hamilton distinguished between “coertion of laws”
and “coertion of arms,”360 and denied that force could ever be used against
States: “But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is
impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also
will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will
increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.”361 Madison offered a
similar critique. He asked the smaller states most attached to the New
Jersey Plan “to consider the situation in which it would leave them.”362
Madison explained: “The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be
impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.”363 Following
Madison’s speech, the Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan and rereported the Virginia Plan.364
Despite this vote, John Lansing again urged the Convention to
adhere to “the foundation of the present Confederacy”365 rather than
depart so completely.
Mason responded by elaborating on his
objections to the introduction of coercive power:
It was acknowledged by (Mr. Patterson) that his plan could
not be enforced without military coertion. Does he consider
355

Id. at 242.
Id. at 245.
357
Id. at 255-56.
358
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 282, 283.
359
Id.
360
Id. at 284.
361
Id. at 285; see also id. (“[The Amphyctionic Council] had in particular the power of fining and using
force agst. delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war.”).
362
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 313, 319.
363
Id. at 320.
364
Id. at 322.
365
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 20, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 108, at 335, 336.
356
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the force of this concession. The most jarring elements of
nature; fire & water themselves are not more incompatible
tha[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution.
Will the militia march from one State to another, in order to
collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of
the Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose?
Will not the citizens of the invaded State assist one another
till they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union
altogether?366
Following Mason’s remarks, the Convention rejected Lansing’s motion and
entertained no further proposals to grant Congress power to command or
coerce the States.367
Once the Convention ended, Madison sent Thomas Jefferson a copy
of the proposed Constitution and explained why the Convention chose to
empower Congress to regulate individuals rather than States:
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union
could not be secured by any system founded on the principle
of a confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary
observance of the federal law by all the members could
never be hoped for. A compulsive one could evidently never
be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal
calamities to the innocent & the guilty, the necessity of a
military force both obnoxious & dangerous, and in general a
scene resembling much more a civil war than the
administration of a regular Government.
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government
which instead of operating, on the States, should operate
without their intervention on the individuals composing
them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion
of representation.368
Madison was not alone in his efforts to explain why the Convention
decided to abandon regulation of States under the Articles of Confederation
in favor of regulation of individuals under the Constitution. Prominent
Federalists echoed his views during the state ratifying debates. For
example, in The Federalist No. 15, Alexander Hamilton explained that
“the present Confederation” could not be retained because there were
366

Id. at 339–40 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 344.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 108, at 131, 131–32.
367
368
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“fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main
pillars of the fabric.”369 Hamilton maintained that this alteration
consisted of abandoning legislation for States (under the Articles) in
favor of authorizing legislation for individuals (under the proposed
Constitution).
In his view, “[t]he great and radical vice in the
construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation
for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom
they consist.”370 Hamilton stressed that if we wished to avoid the
possibility of civil war, “we must extend the authority of the Union to the
persons of the citizens—the only proper objects of government.”371
Hamilton continued these themes in The Federalist No. 16. There,
he argued that in order to avoid a civil war and “dissolution of the
Union,”372 the federal government “must be founded, as to the objects
committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by
the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry the agency to
the persons of the citizens.”373 The “principle contended for by the
opponents of the proposed Constitution” was the “exceptionable principle”
of “legislation for States.”374 Thus, Hamilton made clear that the proposed
Constitution would forgo legislation for States and rely exclusively on
legislation for individuals. Hamilton’s arguments were repeated by
Federalists in numerous state ratifying conventions.375
As adopted, the Constitution departed sharply from the Articles of
Confederation by giving Congress no power to command States to take
legislative or executive action. Because of this omission, the Constitution
had no need to empower Congress to use military force to coerce the States’
compliance with such commands. The States’ failure to authorize these
actions in the Constitution meant that they did not surrender these aspects of
their sovereignty. Under the law of nations, only an express surrender of
369

THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 105, 108.
Id. at 108.
371
Id. at 109.
372
THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 114.
373
Id. at 116.
374
Id. at 113.
375
See Clark, supra note 234, at 1856-62. Critics of the anti-commandeering doctrine sometimes point to
other statements in the Federalist Papers as evidence that the founders authorized and endorsed federal
commandeering of the States. For example, Jeff Powell points to The Federalist Nos. 27, 36, 45, and 81 for the
proposition that “the proposed federal government would have the authority to use state officers to carry out
federal activities.” See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 661,
662-63 (1993). Nothing in these essays contradicts the much more precise discussions at the Convention and in
The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16 rejecting federal power to command and coerce the States. At most, the essays
Powell cites stand for the proposition that Congress has the option of enlisting the voluntary assistance of state
revenue collectors and state courts to accomplish federal goals.
370
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their rights would have sufficed to alienate their sovereignty on these
matters. To be sure, the Articles of Confederation contained a partial
surrender of this kind, but this power was not included in the new
Constitution.
Instead, the Constitution abandoned reliance on
commandeering the States in favor of regulating and coercing individuals.
Because the Constitution proposed by the Convention contained no
provisions giving Congress power to command or coerce States, the
“States” necessarily retained these aspects of their sovereignty under wellknown rules supplied by the law of nations.
Although the Constitution does not empower Congress to command
or coerce States, it does impose certain restrictions and obligations on the
States and their officials. As discussed, Article I, Section 10 prohibits the
States from taking certain actions deemed detrimental to the nation as a
whole.376 In addition, Article VI provides that all state and federal
legislative, executive, and judicial officers “shall be bound by oath or
affirmation, to support this Constitution.”377 Article VI also declares the
Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States to be “the supreme
Law of the Land,” and provides that “the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.”378 Noting these provisions, The Federalist No.
27 observed that “the Legislatures, Courts, and Magistrates of the respective
members will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will
be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.”379 Taken in historical
context, these observations conveyed that state institutions and officials
would be bound by both the Supremacy Clause and the Oath or Affirmation
Clause to follow valid federal law in the performance of their duties under
state law. They say nothing, however, about federal power to command and
coerce the States, as some have argued.380 The Convention quite
376

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
379
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 175.
380
Professor Powell’s critique of the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine appears to have made this
mistake by conflating these distinct modes of enforcement. He points to The Federalist’s discussion of the
Supremacy Clause for the proposition that “the federal government’s proposed powers would extend to the states
as subordinate institutions as well as to individuals.” Powell, supra note 375, at 659. But this confuses a rule of
decision to resolve conflicts between state and federal law with authorization to enforce federal law directly
against States. The Constitution contains a clear and express provision—the Supremacy Clause—establishing a
rule of decision, but contains no provision clearly and expressly authorizing enforcement of federal commands
against States. Indeed, in The Federalist No. 27, Hamilton was arguing against the Anti-Federalist contention that
the proposed federal government under the Constitution would have to rely on “military force to execute its laws.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 171. Rather, because Hamilton recognized
that States might prefer to enforce federal law in some circumstances, he assured Anti-Federalists that the
Constitution would permit States to employ their ordinary means of government for this purpose. Likewise, in
The Federalist No. 45, James Madison dispelled fears over federal collection of internal taxes by pointing out that
377
378
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consciously withheld this authority after extensive debate381 because the
founders were convinced that the federal government could accomplish all
its ends by relying exclusively on “legislation for individuals” while
forgoing “legislation for States.”382 However one reads The Federalist,
nothing but an express surrender in the constitutional text would suffice
under the law of nations to authorize the federal government to conscript
state legislatures or executives into carrying federal laws into execution.
3.

Reassessing the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

This background provides a straightforward rationale for the
Supreme Court’s recent anti-commandeering decisions grounded in the
original public meaning of the term “States.” By using a term of art drawn
from the law of nations, the Constitution signified that the States retained all
of the sovereign rights they secured by issuing the Declaration of
Independence and winning the War of Independence minus only those
rights that they clearly and expressly surrendered in the Constitution.
Because the original Constitution gave Congress no express power to
commandeer the States, the States did not surrender—but necessarily
retained—their traditional sovereignty to control their own legislative and
executive powers free from interference by another sovereign.
This rationale supports each of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering decisions. The Court’s modern anti-commandeering
decisions began with New York v. United States,383 which held that
Congress lacks constitutional power to compel state legislatures to enact
laws implementing a federal regulatory program. Justice O’Connor’s
opinion for the Court acknowledged that “Congress has substantial powers
to govern the Nation directly,” but stressed that “the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress’ instructions.”384 As she recognized, the shift
from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution “‘substitut[ed] a
national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens,
instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly
if the federal government chose not to collect such taxes directly “an option will then be given to the States to
supply their quotas by previous collections of their own.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 112, at 312-13
(James Madison). Giving States the option to participate in the enforcement of federal law is not the same thing
as giving Congress authority to command or coerce them to do so—authority that was explicitly and repeatedly
denied in The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16. See supra notes 369-375, and accompanying text.
381
See supra notes 153-160, and accompanying text.
382
See Clark, supra note 234, at 1903-04 (explaining that “all of the prohibitions placed on the states in the
original Constitution could be enforced through ordinary litigation between individuals or suits brought by
states”).
383
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
384
Id. at 162.
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restricted, only upon the States.’”385 Review of the founding-era debates
convinced the Court that “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”386
In Printz v. United States,387 the Supreme Court applied these
principles to hold that Congress also lacks constitutional authority to
compel state executive officers to enforce a federal regulatory scheme.
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court relied on many of the same
sources cited in New York v. United States, his opinion acknowledged that
“there is no constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether
congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is
unconstitutional.”388 The Court stated that “the answer . . . must be sought
in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”389 The Court’s review of these
sources led it to conclude that Congress’s attempt to command state
executive officers to enforce federal law was unconstitutional.
Critics of the Supreme Court’s decision in Printz have seized upon
Justice Scalia’s concession that “there is no constitutional text” addressing
commandeering to argue that the doctrine is made up or illegitimate.390 As
discussed, however, this critique misunderstands the role of the
constitutional text—and its absence—in determining the residual
sovereignty of the States. Under background principles of the law of
nations, Congress could commandeer the “States” only if they clearly and
expressly authorized such action in the Constitution. The absence of any
constitutional text addressing commandeering thus does not contradict but
affirmatively supports the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Critics also have suggested that the Supreme Court’s position on
federal commandeering of state courts is inconsistent with its broader anticommandeering doctrine. In New York, for example, Justice O’Connor
recognized “the well established power of Congress to pass laws
enforceable in state courts.”391 If Congress may rely on state courts to
enforce federal law, then why may it not rely on state legislatures and
executive officials for this purpose as well? According to the Court, the
constitutional text provides the answer. As Justice Scalia explained in
Printz, “the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law .
. . [is] mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause (‘the Judges in every
385

Id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869)).
Id. at 166.
387
532 U.S. 898 (1997).
388
Id. at 905.
389
Id.
390
Manning, supra note 11, at 2031. Cf. Powell, supra note 380, at 674 (arguing that the “state immunities
approach [endorsed in New York v. United States] . . . is entirely unguided by constitutional text”).
391
505 U.S. at 178 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)); see Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
386
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State shall be bound [by federal law]’).”392 In other words, rightly or
wrongly, the Court appears to regard the text of the Supremacy Clause as a
clear and express surrender of this portion of state sovereignty.393
Most recently, in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association,394 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and applied the anticommandeering doctrine to invalidate the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PASPA”), which made it unlawful for States to enact laws
authorizing gambling on competitive sports events. The Act contained a
grandfather provision excepting Nevada and gave New Jersey a limited
period to opt into this exception. After the time expired, New Jersey voters
approved a constitutional amendment permitting the state legislature to
authorize sports gambling. The Court first found that the legislature had
authorized sports gambling within the meaning of PASPA by repealing
state laws prohibiting such conduct, and then held that the Act violated the
anti-commandeering doctrine. The Court explained its decision in terms
that echo principles drawn from the law of nations. According to the Court,
the Constitution grants Congress enumerated powers, but “conspicuously
absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct
orders to the governments of the States.”395 As the Court put it, “[t]he
anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit
on congressional authority.”396

392

521 U.S. at 928-29.
If one were to conclude that the Supremacy Clause is not a clear and express surrender of this aspect of
state sovereignty, then the States would retain the same degree of sovereignty over their courts as they do over
their legislative and executive functions. For example, dissenting in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 751
(2009), Justice Thomas concluded that “[a]s a textual matter, . . . the Supremacy Clause does not address whether
a state court must entertain a federal cause of action; it provides only a rule of decision that the state court must
follow if it adjudicates the claim.” Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because, in his view, no provision of the
Constitution divests the States of their pre-existing sovereignty over their own courts, Justice Thomas determined
that “[u]nder our federal system, . . . the States have unfettered authority to determine whether their local courts
may entertain a federal cause of action.” Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of how early debates over congressional regulation of state courts drew upon rules of the
law of nations setting the bounds of jurisdiction between sovereigns, and how arguments that diverged from these
rules relied on specific constitutional provisions interpreted to override them, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L. J. 949 (2006); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L. J. 947 (2001) (arguing that under the traditional rules
of the law of nations that defined the bounds of state sovereignty, Congress lacks power to regulate state court
procedures in state law cases).
394
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
395
Id. at 1476.
396
Id. Vik Amar questions whether Murphy went too far in its language, if not its result. As he put it, “[a]t
times Murphy defined unconstitutional commandeering in incredibly broad terms—to include federal laws ‘that
direct[] . . . the States . . . from enacting a regulation of the conduct of activities occurring within their borders.’”
Vikram David Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s Law: Did Something Go Wrong in Reconciling Commandeering and
Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 300. In his view, this formulation is at least in
tension with the conditional preemption doctrine. He argues that “the best reading of Murphy is one under which
Congress’s conditional preemption powers remain intact but can be exercised only when Congress lays out its
conditions with clarity.” Id. at 301.
393
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Commentators have criticized the anti-commandeering doctrine on
the ground that the Constitution does not expressly deny Congress the
power to commandeer States. But the Constitution does not give Congress
all powers except those expressly withheld. Rather, under well-known
principles drawn from the law of nations, the Constitution gives Congress
only those powers expressly granted in the document. This understanding
of congressional power is a necessary consequence of background
principles of the law of nations governing the surrender of sovereign rights.
Under those principle, the “States” mentioned in the Constitution retained
all aspects of their pre-existing sovereignty that they did not expressly
surrender in the Constitution. Accordingly, Congress lacks power to
commandeer the States in violation of their residual sovereignty unless the
Constitution expressly authorizes such action. From this perspective,
constitutional silence on the matter does not support—but conclusively
refutes—congressional power to commandeer the States.
C.

The Equal Sovereignty Doctrine

Finally, understanding the Constitution’s use of the term “State” by
reference to the law of nations supports the Supreme Court’s long-standing
recognition that the States possess equal sovereignty under the Constitution.
The constitutional equality of the States is not the product of freestanding
federalism or judicial activism, as some commentators have suggested.
When the Constitution was adopted, the founders understood independent
states to possess equal sovereignty under the law of nations. By employing
the term “States” in the Constitution, the founders adopted this background
understanding. Under principles drawn from the law of nations, the States
retained their equal sovereignty except to the extent that they expressly
surrendered it in the Constitution.
There has been renewed interest in the equal sovereignty doctrine
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder.397 The
decision invalidated Congress’s 2006 renewal of the preclearance
requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the ground that the
statute’s outdated coverage formula violated the equal sovereignty of the
States. The Court endorsed the proposition that “[n]ot only do States retain
sovereignty under the Constitution,” but “there is also a ‘fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”398 Applying this
principle, the Court invalidated the statute’s unequal treatment of the States.

397
398

570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 544.
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Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant
to its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment as a short-term, five-year
measure to remedy well-documented voting discrimination in certain States
and localities. Congress reenacted the statute without alteration several
times over the years, and most recently reauthorized it in 2006 for an
additional twenty-five years. Shortly after the Act’s original adoption in
1965, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as a proper exercise of
Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. By 2006, however,
minority voting rates in the covered jurisdictions met or exceeded majority
voting rates. Rather than make new findings, Congress “instead reenacted a
formula based on 40–year–old facts having no logical relation to the present
day.”399 For this reason, the Shelby County Court found Congress’s 2006
extension of the coverage provisions to violate the States’ equal
sovereignty.400
Critics of Shelby County charge that the equal sovereignty doctrine
is simply made up and unsupported by the constitutional text.401 For
example, Leah Litman has charged that “[t]here is little basis in the
constitutional text or the drafting history for any constitutional rule that
requires Congress to treat the states equally.” 402 She argues that “the
textual arguments for the equal sovereignty principle are not particularly
compelling,”403 and that “an analysis of the original meaning of the
Constitution reveals no clear understanding or expectation that the
Constitution prohibits Congress from distinguishing among the states.”404
Similarly, Richard Hasen has characterized the equal sovereignty doctrine
as “made up” and “unjustified.”405 Overall, as Neil Katyal and Thomas
Schmidt have observed, “[t]he legal commentariat generally viewed the
doctrine as an invention.”406
A few scholars have defended the legitimacy of the equal
sovereignty doctrine, at least in certain circumstances. Writing before
Shelby County, Gillian Metzger concluded (on the basis of on various
399

Id. at 554.
See id. at 557.
401
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did not go this far, but argued that the doctrine should be limited to the
admission of new States. See id. at 587-88. Some scholars have criticized the decision on other grounds,
including the claim that the Court’s use of the doctrine undermines the availability of constitutional remedies. See
Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty as a Rights Against a Remedy, 76 LA. L. REV. 83 (2015).
402
Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1229 (2016).
403
Id. at 1230.
404
Id. at 1233.
405
Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713,
714, 733 (2014).
406
Neil Kumar Katyal and Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal
Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2133 n. 103 (2015). Accord Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shleby
County’s Principle of Equal Sovereignty, 68 OK. L. REV. 209, 210 (2016) (“Scholars have attacked the equal
sovereignty principle with a surprising degree of unanimity and contempt.”).
400
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features of the constitutional design) that “the intuition that states must be
admitted on equal terms” “appears correct.”407 Similarly, Douglas Laycock
observed that “[t]he Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that
the several states are of equal authority.”408 These scholars did not consider
whether the Supreme Court properly applied the equal sovereignty doctrine
in Shelby County, but two scholars have subsequently defended the Court’s
use of the doctrine in that case.
More recently, Thomas Colby has concluded that “there is a deep
structural principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the
Constitution.”409 Although the Supreme Court had applied the principle
most prominently to ensure the equal footing of newly admitted States,
Colby argues that “the equal footing doctrine is just a particular, concrete
aspect of a broader and deeper principle.”410 He agrees that this broader
principle of equal sovereignty lacks “a clear textual mandate,”411 but argues
that it draws “powerful support” from the history, caselaw, and “underlying
structure of our constitutional system.”412 Although “[t]hat equality was not
spelled out in so many words in the Constitution,” Colby concludes that it
was “a background assumption on which the Constitution was drafted.”413
Similarly, Thomas Schmitt has argued that the principle of equal
sovereignty “is entirely consistent with, and perhaps even supported by,”
constitutional text and precedent.414 In his view, “[b]ecause the states
existed prior to Ratification, it is not surprising that the framers omitted any
mention of equal state sovereignty [in the text].”415 In addition, he
maintains that “the Court’s reasoning [in longstanding precedent] clearly
applies beyond the context of the admission of new states.”416 Finally, he
concludes that “[t]he idea of equal state sovereignty has been a fundamental
assumption of our constitutional order throughout United States history.”417
We agree that the concept of equal sovereignty was an important
background assumption against which the Constitution was drafted and
ratified. But both critics and supporters of the doctrine have paid too little
attention to the constitutional term used by the founders—“States”—to
embody that assumption. As discussed, the original Thirteen Colonies
407

Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1518 (2007).
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288 (1992).
409
Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Equal Sovereignty, 65 DUKE L. J. 1087, 1091 (2016).
410
Id. at 1108.
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Id. at 1102.
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Id. at 1102.
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Id. at 1140.
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Schmitt, supra note 406, at 222.
415
Id. at 223.
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Id. at 229.
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Id. at 238.
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declared themselves to be “Free and Independent States” in the Declaration
of Independence.418 Under the law of nations, “Free and Independent
States” were entitled to the “perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns.”419 The notion of a “State” with fewer sovereign rights than
another “State” was unknown to the law of nations. By using the term
“States,” the Constitution recognized the traditional sovereign rights of the
States minus only those rights that they expressly surrendered in the
document. Accordingly, “[a]lthough the states necessarily compromised
their ‘absolute independence’ by uniting under the Constitution, it does not
follow that they forfeited their ‘absolute equality.’”420 Thus, in order to
restrict the sovereign rights of some States but not others, Congress would
have to point to an express constitutional provision authorizing it to do
so.421 Although the original Constitution contains no such provisions, the
Civil War Amendments empower Congress to take such action when
necessary to enforce their guarantees.
The original Constitution contains no provisions expressly
authorizing Congress to override the equal sovereignty of the States.
Indeed, as explained, in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, the founders
decided not to give Congress any authority to regulate the States.422
Although the original Constitution was designed to forgo federal
regulation of the States, the Civil War Amendments were designed to do
just the opposite. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments imposed important restrictions on
the governance prerogatives of the States by prohibiting slavery, defining
citizenship, and guaranteeing equal protection, due process, and the right to
vote without regard to race. In addition, all three Amendments gave
Congress express power to enforce their prohibitions “by appropriate
legislation.”423 Thus, by adopting these Amendments, the States expressly
surrendered part of their traditional immunity from regulation by another
sovereign and compromised their right to equal sovereignty. The Supreme
Court confirmed this surrender in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,424 which held that
“the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
418

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
420
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1328
(1996).
421
We agree with Thomas Colby that “unequal or discriminatory federal laws implicate the equal
sovereignty principle only when they grant more regulatory authority or capacity for self-government to some
states than to others (or allow some states a greater role than others in the federal government).” Colby, supra
note , at 1150. Accordingly, “federal laws that are drafted in general, nongeographic terms, but have a disparate
impact on some states,” do not violate the equal sovereignty of the States under the Constitution. Id.
422
See Clark, supra note 234, at 1838-62 (describing the debates surrounding the founders’ decision to grant
Congress power to regulate individuals rather than States).
423
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
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427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”425
Thus, in analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County,
the proper question is not whether the States have equal sovereignty under
the original Constitution (they do). Nor is the proper question whether the
States surrendered aspects of their equal sovereignty in the Civil War
Amendments (they did). Rather, the proper question is whether Congress’s
2006 extension of the Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of its power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress undoubtedly has enforcement
power to treat States who violate the Fifteenth Amendment (by denying
their citizens the right to vote on account of race) differently than States
who comply with the Amendment. Although such disparate treatment
overrides the equal sovereignty of the States, it is expressly authorized by
the Civil War Amendments and thus rests on an express surrender of the
States’ right to sovereign equality in this context. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court had little difficulty upholding the original coverage
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.426 As the Court explained at
the time, Congress’s decision to impose stricter conditions on some States
than others was based on “evidence of actual voting discrimination” in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.427
Shelby County presented a different question—namely, whether
Congress’s 2006 extension of the 1965 restrictions without any new
findings of current discrimination was a valid exercise of Congress’s power
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.428 If the Fifteenth Amendment
authorized the extension (as the dissent believed), then there was no
violation of the States’ equal sovereignty because they had surrendered it to
this extent. On the other hand, if the Fifteenth Amendment did not
authorize the extension (as the Court held), then Congress violated the equal
sovereignty retained by the States. Thus, the equal sovereignty issue in
Shelby County turned on the proper interpretation of the Fifteenth
425
Id. at 456 (citation omitted). By contrast, the Court has long held that Congress generally lacks power
under its Article I, Section 8 powers to override the States’ sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The only exception the Court has recognized is when Congress acts pursuant to its
bankruptcy power. See Central Va. Comm. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
426
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
427
Id. at 330. In particular, Congress imposed restrictions on jurisdictions with two characteristics: “the use
of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points
below the national average.” Id.
428
We express no view here on the validity of Congress’s 2006 extension of the Voting Rights Act under its
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. This question is beyond the scope of this Article and turns on the
proper scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. The Supreme Court has recognized
broad congressional power to enforce these Amendments, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326
(1966) (comparing Congress’s enforcement power to that conferred by the Necessary and Proper Clause), but has
also made clear that congressional enforcement legislation must be “congruen[t] and proportiona[l]” to judicially
recognized violations of the prohibitions set forth in the Amendments, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
520 (1997).
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Amendment. The latter question is beyond the scope of this Article. The
important point for present purposes is that States retained their equal
sovereignty under the original Constitution, and Congress can only override
such equality pursuant to an express surrender by the States in a subsequent
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Commentators have charged that the Supreme Court’s most
prominent federalism doctrines lack an adequate basis in the constitutional
text, and thus are inconsistent with the Court’s commitment to textualism.
This charge overlooks the original public meaning of the term “States.”
Read against the backdrop of the law of nations, the Constitution’s use of
the term “States” provides a textual basis for many of the Court’s most
significant doctrines. At the founding, a “State” was a term of art drawn
from the law of nations and referred to an independent state entitled to a
well-known set of sovereign rights. Moreover, under the law of nations, a
State could alienate its sovereign rights only by a clear and express
surrender. In ratifying the Constitution, the American States surrendered
some, but not all, of their sovereign rights. The rights they did not
surrender, they necessarily retained.
There was no need for the
constitutional text to “confer” these rights on the States because they were
never surrendered. This background context provides a firm textual basis
for the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding state sovereign immunity,
prohibiting federal commandeering of the States’ legislative and executive
functions, and recognizing the sovereign equality of the States.
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